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COLLECTIVE ACTION, PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND LAW REFORM: THE STORY OF THE
LABOR INJUNCTION
Eileen Silverstein*
This essay concerns the persistence of ideas about collective
action and property rights. It analyzes the one-hundred year history of
using injunctions against picketing in labor disputes, and concludes
that contemporary decision-makers display the same hostility to the
exercise of collective rights and the same solicitude for property
rights as did the courts in the period from the 1880's to the early
1930's. The finding that attitudes about the rights of capital and labor
endure might be unremarkable, except that intervening legislation
purported to confer legitimacy on collective action and to weaken
traditional deference to property rights.' Thus, in addition to exploring entrenched notions about rights, this essay inquires into the use of
law to challenge those notions. My hope is that close examination of
one attempt at reform through law will identify some of the conditions under which legal intervention can help to make the world
otherwise. To that end, this essay is also a modest plea to progressive
scholars to once again make the connection of law to everyday life
central to our commentary. Without fresh appreciation of the law as
an element of social struggle, we risk complicity in the renaissance of
ideas about the natural priority of property rights against which our
* B.A., University of Nebraska; J.D., University of Chicago; Professor of Law,
University of Connecticut School of Law.
My appreciation to Alan Ritter, Dianne Avery, Jim Atleson, Joe Grodin, George
Schatzki, Jack Getman, and Ted Lothstein for pressing the hard questions; to Jennifer
Mansfield, Jaye Bailey, Mary McCune and Peter Goselin for able research assistance; and to
the 1991 labor law seminar at the University of Connecticut whose startled reaction to the
story of the labor injunction prompted me to write this article.
1. The observation that changes in law have little altered the relationship between labor
and management may be controversial but it is not new. I have previously demonstrated the
tenacity of market regulation as a governing ideology in another area of labor law - the
successorship doctrine under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). See Eileen Silverstein,
The Fate of Workers in Successor Firms: Does Law Tame The Market?, 8 INDUs. REL. LJ.
153 (1986). At the same time Jim Atleson canvassed all of labor law under the NLRA to
show the shared values advanced by judges operating under the common law and under the
NLRA. See JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAw
(1983) [hereinafter VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS]. For the view that law can play a significant

role in labor relations, see William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARv. L. Rav. 1111 (1989).
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intellectual forebears struggled.2
The regulation of labor picketing through injunctions is an especially good subject for studying the persistent reverence for property
rights and the stubborn reluctance to acknowledge a robust legitimacy
for collective rights. In the 1930's, when legislators began to use
statutes as the primary basis for regulating labor relations in general,
the state acted explicitly, in response to popular and scholarly critiques, to change the background substantive rules governing the use
of labor injunctions. During the common law period, the prevailing
doctrines stressed the sanctity of property rights, including the right to
carry on a lawful business, and questioned the legitimacy of collective
action including the use of picketing in support of demands for higher wages. The tendency to favor entrepreneurial interests was not
surprising, since the common law had been framed without reference
to the conflicts between labor and capital. For example, courts applied
the tort of unjustified interference with business relations to struggles
between trade unions and entrepreneurs, even though the analogy
between disputes arising from commercial competition and those
arising from disagreements about employment terms was strained,3
and even though the justification asserted by the workers, combination
for increased wages as a collective right, was not recognized by a
common law developed in and for a commercial context. Reform
legislation like the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932,' the Wagner Act
of 1935, and state anti-injunction laws" acknowledged the inadequate
tailoring of the common law rules to the shape of labor-management
conflicts. More important, the new statutory formulations were expressly crafted to trim the inequalities of bargaining power between
capital and labor.7 With regard to whether to issue injunctions in

2. Or, as my colleague Jeremy Paul observed, "those of us who believe that no question as basic as the relationship between individual liberty and collective action can ever be
'settled' must continue to confront the opposing arguments:' See Jeremy Paul, Searching for
the Status Quo, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 743, 785 (1986).
3. And some would say demonstrates the weakness of reasoning by analogy.
4. Ch. 90, § 2, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 102-115 (1988)).
5. National Labor Relations Act, Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-168 (1988)).
6. Twenty-three states and Puerto Rico have anti-injunction laws, many with provisions
modeled on Norris-LaGuardia (Ariz., Cal., Conn., Haw., Idaho, Ill., Kan., La., Me., Md.,
Mass., Minn., NJ., N.M., N.Y., N.D., Or., Pa., Tex., Utah, Wash., Wis., Wyo.) See infra
notes 160-91 and accompanying text. Eighteen of the states adopted their anti-injunction laws
by 1940.
7. Scholars as diverse as Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, 92
YALE LJ. 1357 (1983); Matthew W. Fmkin, Revisionism in Labor Law, 43 MD. L. REV. 23
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labor disputes and the scope of restrictions on picketing, the break
with the past was deliberate and well documented
Part I explores the history of equitable relief against picketing
and the adoption of anti-injunction legislation in the 1930's. This
narrative serves as background and as evidence, establishing a basis
for assessing current practices and for demonstrating how the law
shapes the meaning of events when it privileges the perspective of
one set of participants.9 Part II chronicles the initial judicial response
to Norris-LaGuardia, and challenges standard understandings of the
Act as successfully establishing the legitimacy of collective action and
as curtailing the regime of labor regulation by injunction. Beginning
with the premise that Norris-LaGuardia constituted only one element
in a changing legal environment, I argue for a revised assessment of
the Act and of the effect of anti-injunction legislation on the recognition of rights. My claim is that contemporaneous developments in
federal and state laws contributed importantly to the demise of the
federal labor injunction but that these contemporaneous developments
also allowed pre-statutory attitudes about collective action to flourish.
This claim is supported by analysis of present attitudes about the
conflict between collective action and property rights, as reflected in
federal administrative and state court decisions that now set the standards for regulating labor disputes. The evidence suggests a wavering
fidelity to the reforms sought by anti-injunction legislation and to a
robust appreciation for collective rights. ° Finally, I draw some conclusions about the role of law in furthering demands that collective
rights be taken as seriously as property rights. I do not offer a general theory of the causal relationship between law and social
change," but I do incline to the view that struggle, not law, initiates
(1984); Thomas R. Haggard, Private Injunctive Relief Against Labor Union Violence: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislature, 71 KY. LJ. 509 (1982); and, Karl E. Kiare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness,
1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. Rsv. 265 (1978), recognize the change of rules intended by the
Congress, although they differ on the extent of the changes contemplated, the reasons for
post-enactment developments, and the wisdom of displacing common law doctrines.
8. Congress was reacting against judicial miseadings of the federal antitrust laws as
well as against developments under the common law. See Dianne Avery, Images of Violence
in Labor Jurisprudence: The Regulation of Picketing and Boycotts, 1894-1921, 37 BUFF. L.
REV. 1, 53-69 (1988-89).
9. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 880-87
(1990); PATCIA J. WILLIAMS. THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
10. Part MI also confirms the skepticism of some scholars that judicial influence in mediating labor disputes has diminished. See Klare, supra note 7; VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS,
supra note 1.
11. See Joseph W. Singer, Property and Coercion in Federal Indian Law: The Conflict
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and sustains progressive change and that any discussion about a law's
role in contributing to change can only be answered by reference to
concrete events at carefully defined times. Furthermore, viewpoint

matters in evaluating the success of a struggle. 2 The conclusion,
therefore, looks at anti-injunction legislation and the struggle to

achieve legitimacy for collective rights and to reduce class inequality
from the perspective of workers.
I. FROM ENJOINED INTIMIDATION TO UNENJOINABLE PERSUASION
The Norris-LaGuardia Act embodies a conscious effort to rewrite
the rules regarding the use of injunctions to restrain collective activity
in labor disputes. This Part examines the animating ideas that allowed
easy access to injunctions before Norris-LaGuardia and the contrasting
judgments about collective activity and property rights ratified by
Congress in 1932.
A.

"[T]he necessary element of intimidation in the
presence of groups as pickets"' 3

The conditions giving rise to the use of injunctions in labor
disputes are quickly summarized. 4 Organizing labor enjoyed only
partial acceptance. To defeat collective activity, employers would

replace union supporters with workers willing to accept employment
conditioned on the promise not to join a union. When such exploita-

Between Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S.CAL. L. REV. 1821, 1838 (1990). "In
adopting strategies for change, one must remember that no abstract theory of the relation
between law and society can provide a blueprint for reform. Rather, we must attend to the
actual working of structures of power in society." Id.
12. See E.P. THOMPSON, WmIGs AND HuNTERs: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT (1975).
See also Ed Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlements, and the Social Struggle:
A Friendly Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REv. 509 (1984);
Gerald P. Lopez, The Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1989).
13. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 207
(1921) (Chief Justice William Howard Taft writing for the seven-member majority).
14. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & NAmAN GRe, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930);
EDWIN WrrrE, THE GOVERNMET IN LABOR DISPUTES (1932); Avery, supra note 8. Forbath,
supra note 1, at 1148-1202, revisits and enriches the institutionally-focused work of Frankfurter, Greene, and Witte; he also highlights the shift from local to national strikes along with
the increase in sympathy actions such as boycotts as reasons for the increasing use of injunctions in labor disputes. Forbath, supra note 1, at 1152-53. Bonnet establishes that the use of
legal intervention to secure employer goals has a long and consistent history. See Clarence E.
Bonnet, The Origin of the Labor Injunction, 5 S.CAL. L. REV. 105 (1931) (arguing that a
combination by employees is a reaction against a combination by employers).
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tion of the labor market did not thus defeat the demands of trade
unionists, employers turned to the courts. Although settled doctrines
in criminal law and torts could be applied to collective action, neither
conviction for criminal conspiracy nor damages for tortious interference with business was certain or timely. Jurors identified with workers seeking economic gains and frequently declined to penalize their
conduct or to impose large fines; judges would not act unilaterally in
the context of a public trial; and labor organizations were often judgment-proof. Even when employers won the legal battle in court, they
often lost the economic war at the workplace, having acquiesced to
the demands of organized labor in order to maintain, or in the case
of a strike resume, production.
What employers needed from the courts was a form of timely
intervention that deprived workers of the power to force concessions. 5 The equitable remedy of an injunction served this purpose.
Under the standards in force from the 1880's to the early 1930's, an
initial restraining order could be issued on the basis of formulaic
allegations of collective action tending toward violence and harm to
persons or property, which were, sometimes accompanied by affidavits, often submitted ex parte to a judge.'6 Those sympathetic to
labor's cause, whether stranger, family or friend, could also be enjoined from interfering with the employer's business.17 The same
judge could punish asserted violations of the restraining order through
contempt proceedings. And most important, a judicial command to
halt concerted activities, even temporarily, accomplished the twin
goals of thwarting the union's campaign and tarnishing the image of
organized labor in advance of any determination that the strike, boycott or picket was actually illegal. As Francis Sayre observed,
[In labor cases] the issue of a temporary injunction or restraining
order commonly results, not, as in ordinary cases, in maintaining the
status quo and thus preventing irreparable injury until a more thor-

15. Bonnett, supra note 14, at 122-23 (suggesting that the first labor injunction arose out
of the need to quell violence by agents of capital and labor during an 1877 rail strike).
16. See WrrrF, supra note 14, at 86-87; FRANKFuRTER & GREENE, supra note 14, at
47-81.
17. Indeed, the blanket injunctions often extended to "other persons unknown to the
complainant and unknown to the court." 75 CONG. R.c. 5480 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1932) (statement of Rep. LaGuardia). They also extended to "all persons combining and conspiring with
[the defendants] and all other persons whomsoever." In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 570 (1895).
Forbath has aptly described these injunctions as "'criminal codes' for entire working class

communities." Forbath, supra note 1, at 1184.
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ough examination of the issues can be made, but in virtually award-

ing victory in advance by tying the hands of the defendants during
the critical moments of the struggle."

Indeed, the community rarely learned whether the workers had pursued a lawful end through lawful means because the judicially ordered cessation of concerted activity made further pursuit of the legal
claim pointless. Dissolution of the order following a trial or an appeal
could not restore the accumulated pressure on an employer's business,
nor compensate workers for their lost opportunity to change working
conditions or the union for its fruitless expenditures.
At the same time that the restraining order forced workers to
abandon collective action and to accept their employer's terms (or
seek jobs elsewhere), the judicial intervention sent a signal of official
displeasure with the workers' tactics calculated to "convince 'that
large neutral element which is not permanently enlisted on either side
of the labor-capital struggle' that the unions were in the wrong."19

On the basis of partial, untested allegations, labor disputes became
linked with illegality in judicial and popular attitudes; and every
restraining order, whether temporary or permanent, reinforced the
image of organized workers threatening employers, nonunionized
employees and the public with force, violence, or unjustified and
severe economic harm"
In theory, of course, equity offered relief to unions and employers alike, and a few labor organizations successfully sought injunctions against combinations of employers intent on breaching collective
bargaining agreements.2 The primary beneficiaries of equitable orders were, however, employers for the simple reason that jurists
shared the values of entrepreneurs, looking askance at collective activity and equating temporal business interests with constitutionally sacrosanct property rights. Contemporary commentary by Felix

18. Francis B. Sayre, Labor and the Courts, 39 YALE LJ. 682, 682 (1930). See also
FRANKFURTER & GREEN0,
supra note 14, at 17 (quoting Eugene V. Debs on the devastating
effect of injunctions issued by federal courts in connection with the Pullman strike).
19. Daniel R. Ernst, The Closed Shop, the Proprietory Capitalist and the Law, 18971915, in MASrERS To MANAGERS 132, 141 (Sanford M. Jacoby ed., 1991) (citations and

footnote omitted).
20. Forbath, supra note 1, argues that the judicial condemnation also had a significant
influence on the labor movements' tactics and goals, adding strength to the support for leaders who stressed narrow business unionism over class-based reforms.
21. FRANKFURTER & GREENF, supra note 14, at 108-11; Forbath, supra note 1, at 1195
(concluding that there were no more than 25 pro-labor decrees as compared to his estimate
of 2100 anti-labor decrees in the 1920's).
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Frankfurter and Nathan Greene repeatedly accuses jurists of bias
against working people in language stripped of the facade of academic neutrality. ' Historian William Forbath traces this judicial hostility
to labor organizations to the broadening scope of collective activity
and to workers' demands that union rules be recognized as the governing force of the workplace.
iThere were two dimensions of meaning in judges' recurrent use of
words like "tyranny," "dictatorship," and "usurpation" in characterizing broad strikes and boycotts. Such collective actions were unjustified, irresponsible concentrations of power, but they were also bodies of men presuming to act as self-constituted sovereigns, "attempt[ing]," as the Supreme Court declared in In re Debs, to exercise "powers belonging only to government."
The injunction condemned the collective activity, confirmed the sanctity of property rights, and reasserted the primacy of civil law.'
When unions pointed out that equity traditionally treated only tangible
things as property, thus removing interference with business or pecuniary transactions from the reach of an injunction, the tradition yielded a new definition of property as things of exchangeable value.'
Strikes or boycotts interfering with "the right to do business" could,
therefore, be enjoined as interferences with property rights.
Even when substantive legal doctrines appeared to cede no special solicitude to employer interests, the rule of law did not generate
equal treatment of unions and employers engaged in similar types of
economic activity.' For example, workers acted in restraint of trade
when they refused, pursuant to union rules, to work on materials produced by nonunion shops, but no injunction would be issued against
suppliers that combined to sell materials only to employers maintaining an open shop policy.' Similarly, workers who refused in combi22. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 14, at 68-75, 81, 105-08, 165-66,
169.
23. Forbath, supra note 1, at 1154 (citation and footnotes omitted). See also id. at 113034, 1168-69, on the class backgrounds of judges. Accord 1 ADAM SMirrH, THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS, chs. 8 & 10, pt. 2 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976).
24. Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE LJ. 825, 836 (1926).
25. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). See also Witte, supra note 24, at 836. For
discussion of a similar transformation of the idea of property in areas not involving labor
relations, see Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modem Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325 (1980).
26. See Sayre, supra note 18, at 689-91; Bonnett, supra note 14, at 113-17. Forbath
notes that unionists also remarked on the different treatments. Forbath, supra note 1, at 120607.
27. Compare United States v. Brims, 272 U.S. 549 (1926) and Bedford Cut Stone Co.
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nation to work except for higher wages engaged in a criminal conspiracy, while employers that combined to depress wages acted lawflly, on the ground that "a combination to resist oppression not
merely supposed but real, would be perfectly innocent; for where the
act to be done and the means of accomplishing it are lawful, and the
object to be attained is meritorious, combination is not conspiracy."'
Similarity of means or ends did not lead to similarity of legal conclusions.
Within the hierarchy of questionable activities undertaken by
unions, attempts to persuade nonstriking workers, suppliers and consumers not to patronize struck employers enjoyed a particularly unsavory reputation." Jurists writing from the 1880's to the early 1930's
never questioned that persuasion accomplished by acts of violence,
force, or actual physical intimidation merited equitable relief. The
only contested issue was whether peaceful patrols in themselves constituted coercion, force or unlawful intimidation."c Two distinct
themes emerged during this period. The prevailing view, as captured
by the majority of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in the celebrated
1896 case of Vegelahn v. Guntner,3' asserted that "[i]ntimidation is
not limited to threats of violence or of physical injury to person or
property. It has a broader signification, and there also may be a moral intimidation which is illegal."'32 Thus, a patrol of strikers was enjoined from all picketing, including social persuasion. Twenty-five
years later in American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades
Council,33 the United States Supreme Court echoed this sentiment in
v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927) with Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, 268 U.S. 64 (1925), discussed in Sayre, supra note 18, at 690
("Many acute thinkers have been unable to discover any substantial difference in principle between the Brims case and the Bedford Cut Stone case on the one hand, and the San Francisco Industrial Association case on the other."). To the same effect, see Sayre, supra note
18, at 692-93 (inducing breach of contract), 699-700 (boycotts), 703-04 (unfair lists).
28. Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Bright. 36 (Pa. 1821), discussed in Sayre, supra note 18,
at 685-86. Compare the Philadelphia Cordwainers case (1806), reprinted in 3 J. COMMONS &
E. GLMOR, DOCUMENTARY HISTORy OF AMmuCAN INDUSTRIAL Socm'rT 59-248 (1926).
29. See Sayre, supra note 18, at 700.
30. Ici at 701 n.72, 702 n.73, for a collection of the cases. On the English experience
with picketing, see Jerome R. Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation and the Courts, 10 N.C. L.
REV. 158, 160 n.11 (1932).
31. 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896).
32. Id. at 1077. See also Gevas v. Greek Resturant Workers' Club, 134 A. 309, 314
(NJ. 1926) ("A single sentinel, constantly parading in front of a place of employment for
any extended length of time, may be just as effective in striking terror to the souls of the
employees, bound there by their duty, as was the swinging pendulum in Poe's famous story,
'The Pit and the Pendulum,' to the victims chained in its ultimate path.").
33. 257 U.S. 184 (1921) (Clarke, J.dissented). Justice Brandeis concurred "in substance
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reviewing the propriety of an injunction against the importuning of
unwilling listeners by patrols of from four to twelve persons.
The numbers of the pickets in the groups constituted intimidation.
The name "picket" indicated a militant purpose, inconsistent with
peaceable persuasion. The crowds [that the pickets] drew made the
passage of the employees to and from the place of work, one of
running the gauntlet. Persuasion or communication attempted in such
a presence and under such conditions was anything but peaceable
and lawful.
Accordingly, the strikers and their sympathizers were "limited to one
representative for each point of ingress and egress in the plant or
' and all others were enjoined "from congregating
place of business"35
or loitering at the plant or in the neighboring streets by which access
is had to the plant" in order "to prevent the inevitable intimidation of
the presence of groups of pickets . . . ."" Indeed, the Court chastised the appeals court below for allowing groups of pickets as long
as they did not patrol "'in a threatening or intimidating manner.' This
qualification seems to us to be inadequate ....
It ignores the necessary element of intimidation in the presence of groups as pickets."'37

in the opinion and the judgment of the court." ld. at 213.
34. Id. at 205. The courts appear to use the terms picket and patrol interchangeably. The
use of the term picket to describe workers who patrol and seek to persuade others to cease
doing business with an employer merits investigation. The term picket was originally applied
in the military to describe armed soldiers who stood watch for the enemy. The Oxford English Dictionary applies the term to "men acting in a body or singly who are stationed by a
trades-union or the like, to watch men going to work during a strike or in non-union workshops, and to endeavor to dissuade or deter them" and cites a Times article of August 1867.
7 OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 824-25 (1933). How did a term associated with armed patrollers and battle come to be applied to workers with economic complaints? On the use of
the term gauntlet, see Avery, supra note 8, at 105-06. On the term coercion, see Edgar A.
Jones, Jr., Picketing and Coercion: A Jurisprudence of Epithets, 39 VA. L. REv. 1023, 102831 (1953).
35. American Steel Foundries, 257 U.S. at 206.
36. kld at 206-07. See Hellerstein, supra note 30, at 182-83 (stating that before American
Steel Foundries, few cases referred to the actual number of persons on the picket line, but
that the "almost universal practice" following the decision was to limit the number of pickets).
37. 257 U.S. at 207. ("The purpose should be... to allow missionaries."). American
Steel Foundries involved interpretation of Section 20 of the Clayton Act; but the Court signalled the general applicability of its analysis by observing that Section 20 (forbidding injunctions against peaceful persuasion and peaceable assembly) introduced "no new principle into
the equity jurisprudence of... courts. It is merely declaratory of what was the best practice
always." Id. at 203. Subsequently, Chief Justice Taft characterized the holding in American
Steel Foundries as "[w]e held that . . . picketing was unlawful, and that it might be enjoined
as such, and that peaceful picketing was a contradiction in terms .... " Truax v. Corrigan,
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The contrasting viewpoint recognized a difference between persuasion and intimidation, but was slow to develop a substantial following. Justice Holmes, on the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1896,
objected that "it cannot be said, I think, that two men, walking together up and down a sidewalk, and speaking to those who enter a
certain shop, do necessarily and always thereby convey a threat of
force."3 A few states adopted laws intended to stop the use of injunctions against peaceful picketing,39 and some in Congress repeatedly pressed for similar legislation restricting the equity jurisdiction of
federal courts.' While these efforts, along with exhortations by commentators and labor leaders, served to keep the debate alive, the
hostility to picketing persisted. Holmes wrote in dissent; the Supreme
Court continued to hold state anti-injunction statutes unconstitutional
as denials of property rights and equal protection;41 and Congress
routinely defeated proposals to limit the equity jurisdiction of the
federal courts.42 The rule of one picket per entrance and the rhetoric
of picketing as necessarily "intimidating" and "sinister" became standard in federal and state courts in the years before 1932."'

257 U.S. 312, 340 (1921). But see iL at 371 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Mhis court has
recently held [in American Steel Foundries] that peaceful picketing is not unlawful."). See
also the often-quoted opinion in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Gee, 139 F. 582 (S.D.

Iowa 1905) (equating "peaceful picketing" with "chaste vulgarity," "peaceful mobbing," 'and
"lawful lynching").

38. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting). But
Holmes acquiesced in American Steel Foundries. See Avery, supra note 8, at 91 n.415, 9699.
39.

FRANKFURTER & GREMNE, supra note 14, at 153.

40. Id at 154-55.
41. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). The Court recognized that inequalities of fortune deprived workers of meaningful freedom to contract but held

that the Constitution forbade legislative redistribution (Justices Brandeis, Clarke and Pitney
also dissented). See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S.
366, 397 (1898).
42. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 14, at 154-58.
43. Id. at 89-122. The author of American Steel Foundries, Chief Justice William
Howard Taft, exhibited his contempt for organized labor with pride. See IRVINa BERNsTm,
THE LEAN YEARS 190-91 (1960); Avery, supra note 8, at 21-22 (quoting Taft's letters about
enjoining strikes).
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B.

'abor...

asks... no favors from the State.
It wants to be let alone and to be
allowed to exercise its rights.""

A combination of factors led to a critical reassessment of picketing and of the larger issue of regulating labor disputes through injunctions. Repeated, violent confrontations between workers and private security forces exposed the contributions of the latter to disturbances once viewed as the sole responsibility of organized labor;4
intensified lobbying by unions highlighted the extent to which the
injunction against collective activity had become the ordinary, not an
extraordinary, remedy in labor disputes;- academic criticism of the
increasing use and abuses of equitable relief, including restraints

against peaceful picketing,47 crystallized into public unease over the
degree of government involvement in labor relations;' and, perhaps

crucial, the political climate accompanying the Great Depression
opened up the debate on how to accommodate the struggle between

assertions of collective rights as opposed to property rights.49 In 1932

44. Samuel Gompers, Judicial Vindication of Labor's Claims, 7 AM. FEDERATIONIST 283,
284 (1901), quoted in Forbath, supra note 1, at 1205.
45. See Great N. Ry. v. Brosseau, 286 F. 414, 416, 418 (D.N.D. 1923) ("[Tjhe sooner
public police officers are substituted for... private detectives, the better it will be for all
parties concerned in strikes ....
The impartial history of strikes teaches that there is as
much danger to strikers on the picket line from private detectives and sometimes from new
employis, as there is of the same kind of wrong on the part of strikers against new
employis."); Forbath, supra note 1, at 1185-95, discusses the violence attributable to private
security forces. See also Richard Hofstadter, Reflections on Violence in the United States in
A/MmucAN VIOLENCE: A DOCuMENTARY HISTORY 19-20 (Richard Hofstadter & Michael
Wallace eds., 1970) ("With a minimum of ideologically motivated class conflict, the United
States has somehow had a maximum of industrial violence. And no doubt the answer to this
must be sought more in the ethos of American capitalists than in that of the workers").
Accord id. at 37, 39.
46. Forbath, supra note 1, at 1218-33.
47. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 14, at 102-03 (stating that labor is discriminated against by the judiciary); WrrrE, supra note 14, at 91 (stating that industrial disputes
present special problems requiring special treatment).
48. 75 CONG. REC. 5478 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1932) (statement of Rep. LaGuardia).
49. See 75 CONG. REC. 5494 (daily ed. Mar. 8. 1932) and the legislative history, infra
notes 65-73 and accompanying text. Anti-injunction proposals were introduced in every Congress between 1894 and 1914. See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 14, at 163. In the
1930 Congressional elections, Democrats did well and the American Federation of Labor
received commitments of support for anti-injunction legislation from candidates many of
whom were elected from industrial states. Even before the Depression the Senate responded
to the concerns of organized labor, by rejecting the appointment of Judge John Parker to the
United States Supreme Court. Parker authored the widely criticized Red Jacket opinion up-
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and President Hoover
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signed,"

the Norris-

LaGuardia Act, limiting the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts in

labor disputes to circumstances where "such action is imperatively
demanded."'" Many states thereafter adopted little Norris-LaGuardia
acts similarly restricting the authority of state courts.52
Structurally, the Norris-LaGuardia Act divides collective activity
into two categories, either denying or limiting the power of federal
courts to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction. 3 Nine activities are insulated from any type of injunction,
including refusals to work, membership in a union, peaceful assemblies to promote interests in a labor dispute, and giving information
about a labor dispute by any means not involving violence or
fraud.' As to conduct still subject to the court's equity jurisdiction,
an injunction cannot issue unless evidence establishes that unlawful
acts have been threatened and will be committed unless restrained, or

have been committed and will continue unless restrained (the unlawful
acts requirement); that substantial and irreparable injury will follow
unless an injunction is issued (the irreparable injury requirement); that

as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted upon
the plaintiff by denial of the relief than upon the defendant by grant-

ing the relief (the balance of harms requirement); that there is no
adequate remedy at law; and that the public officers charged with the

duty to protect the plaintiff's property are unable or unwilling to
furnish adequate protection (the public safety requirement).
holding broad-scale injunctions against striking miners. See BERNSTEiN, supra note 43, at 40609.

50. Ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 102-115 (1988)). The vote was
75 to 5 in the Senate and 362 to 14 in the House. 75 CONrG. REc. 5019, 5511 (daily ed.
Mar. 8, 1932). Some members of the Congress and President Hoover may have assumed the
statute would be held unconstitutional. See BERNmusEN, supra note 43, at 414; Lauf v. E. G.
Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938) (holding the Norris-LaGuardia Act constitutional).
51. S.REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1932).
52. See Note, Current Legislative and Judicial Restrictions on State Labor Injunction
Acts, 53 YALE LJ. 553 (1944). Here I discuss the text and legislative history of the NorrisLaGuardia Act because the state laws are modeled on their federal counterpart and because
the public policy animating all anti-injunction laws is fully developed for Norris-LaGuardia. It
should be noted, however, that states could have employed a different approach, considered
unavailable to Congress in the 1930's, that of a general revision of the substantive law of
labor combinations. See Edwin E.Witte, The FederalAnti-Injunction Act, 16 MINN. L. REV.
638, 649 (1932) [hereinafter Federal Anti-Injunction Act].
53. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
54. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1988).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). Section 108 also requires the complainant to have met all
legal and settlement obligations (the clean hands requirement); this prerequisite is strictly
construed. See Brotherhood of 1R. Trainmen v. Toledo, Peoria & W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50
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Procedurally, the Act requires notice, a hearing, and testimony
subject to cross examination before an injunction issues, with the
proviso that a temporary restraining order for no longer than five
days may be granted without notice on a showing of substantial and
irreparable injury and on testimony under oath of facts adequate to
support a temporary injunction.' Charges of contempt are subject to
trial by jury and the defendant may seek removal of the judge who
issued the underlying restraining order.' The Act reinforces these
structural and procedural elements by instructing judges that "every
restraining order or injunction.., growing out of a labor dispute
shall include only a prohibition of such specific act or acts as may be
expressly complained of ... and as shall be expressly included in
[the] said findings of fact made and filed by the court. . .. "'I
Each of these prohibitions, standards and procedures responds to
the concerns identified as necessitating anti-injunction legislation and
to Congress' more general assessment of the institutional weakness in
having federal courts set labor policy. The Senate Report accompanying the bill is blunt:
It is amazing to realize that in the last forty years there has developed in the American courts the practice of writing a special law to
fit the individual case by judges in issuing labor injunctions ...
and then enforcing this new law made by the court .... It is
difficult to see how any civilized people could indefinitely submit to
such tyrannical procedure. It is not difficult to understand how such
cruel laws, made not by any legislature but by a judge upon the
bench, should bring our Federal courts into disrepute .... What
free American citizen is willing to submit to the violation of his

(1944); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 121 B.R. 428 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) and cases cited therein, aft'd, 923 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiarn).
56. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). The requirement of irreparable
injury in the context of a temporary restraining order means the complainant must establish
that the act of giving notice would itself lead to irreparable injury. "The only object in issuing a temporary restraining order without notice is because it is alleged by the complainant
that notice of such application would bring about destruction of his property." S. REP. No.
163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1932) (emphasis added). Section 7 also requires the complainant to post a bond.
57. Originally, 29 U.S.C. §§ 111-112. Section 111 was repealed in 1948, 62 Stat. 862,
and recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 3692. Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
now governs matters formerly covered by Section 112.
58. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 9, 29 U.S.C. § 109 (1988).
59. See Ralph K. Winter, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contemporary Role of Norris-LaGuardia,70 YALE LJ. 70 (1960).
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sacred rights of human liberty and freedom?'

Accordingly, in Section 2 of Norris-LaGuardia, Congress declared, for the first time, the public policy of the United States in
relation to the issuing of injunctions in labor disputes, and emphasized that "[t]he object of setting up such a policy is to assist the
courts in the proper interpretation of the proposed legislation .... 1,
Congress further directed that the proper interpretation is to "protect
labor in the lawful and effective exercise of its conceded rights
-

...

protect first, the right of free association and, second, the

right to advance the lawful object of association."'

To this end, as

Representative Celler reminded his colleagues, Norris-LaGuardia did

not make conduct lawful; it merely removed the possibility of equitable relief tainted by jurists hostile to or inadequately informed about
labor's interests:
All we do by the passage of this bill is to follow the English practice and relegate the disputants to the criminal side of the law and
to actions for damages. Only in rare cases do we allow injunctions
in this bill.
If acts of fraud and violence are committed, if criminal statutes are
violated, if municipal ordinances are infracted, if the peace authorities cannot cope with the situation, then an injunction may issue,
otherwise go to the criminal court and get your redress there.'
With reference to picketing, Congress severely limited the discretion of the federal courts. Subsection 4(e) provides that courts may
not enjoin the act of "[giving publicity to the existence of, or the
facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking,
patrolling, or by any other method not involving fraud or violence."" Any question as to whether picketing was considered a

60. S. Rap. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1932).
61. Id. at 10. See also 75 CoNo. RaC. 4502 (daily ed. Feb. 23, 1932) (remarks of Sen.

Norris).
62. S. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1932).
63. 75 CONo. REc. 5490 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1932) (statement of Rep. Celler) (the practice in twentieth-century England did not allow injunctions in labor disputes until 1971). The
single exception to the statement that Norris-LaGuardia did not change the legality of conduct
is § 3 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 103, which makes unenforceable agreements not to join a

labor organization, known as yellow dog contracts.
64. Norris-LaGuardia Act § 4(e), 29 U.S.C. § 104(e) (emphasis added). Picketing is
protected only by construction, see infra text accompanying notes 64-73.
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method necessarily involving "fraud or violence" is answered by the
legislative history. The House considered, and ultimately rejected, an
amendment to Section 4(e) that would have prohibited giving information "by any method not involving fraud, violence, threats or
' Representative Celler advised that
intimidation."
it would be foolhardy to amend Section 4(e) to prohibit "threats or intimidation"
because courts had in the past interpreted these terms to enjoin many
lawful union activities, including peaceful picketing.'
An examination of the precedents in this country and in the State
and Federal courts will show that the word "intimidation" forms the
basis of greatest abuse in labor injunctions. The cases seem to indicate that the word "intimidation" is not capable of exact definition,
and hence the courts become laws unto themselves. There is no
limit to what the judges embrace within the word "intimidation." If
this amendment were adopted it would cover all sorts of peaceful
and lawful actions. You would destroy "peaceful picketing," recognized universally as proper and lawful. Judges, however, have twisted evidence into strained meanings. They have on occasion prevented peaceful picketing as a result of so-called "intimidation."'
Also speaking in opposition to the amendment, Representative
Browning explained that "[i]f anyone comes into court and claims
that he has been threatened or intimidated, it is the easiest thing in
the world to say that certain conditions prevail. It is a matter you
cannot establish, except by the opinion of the one who claims he has
been intimidated."'
Finally, the House Report on the bill that became the NorrisLaGuardia Act explained the need for Section 4 by referring to court
decisions that restricted the intended protections for collective action
in Section 20 of the Clayton Act. Specifically:
In the case of American Steel Foundries Co. v. Tri-City Central
65. 75 CONG. REc. 5507 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1932) (statement of Rep. Michener) (emphasis supplied).
66. Id. at 5506 (echoing the remarks of Rep. LaGuardia, a co-sponsor of the bill, who
cited Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 P. 155 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1906) and
Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896)).
67. 75 CONG. REc. 5506 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1932) (statement of Rep. Celler). Accord id.
at 5489 (statement of Rep. Celler) (stating that federal judges "obsessed with the idea that
there could be no peaceful persuasion through the practice of picketing") and the legislative
history quoted infra, notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
68. 75 CONG. REC. 5506 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1932) (statement of Rep. Browning). For an
enlightening discussion of intimidation and coercion, see Jones, supra note 34.
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Trades Council, there was a strike, and of course, a picket line.
There was practically no fraud or violence but the persistent giving
of publicity to facts involved in the dispute and the persistent advising of other persons without fraud or violence not to work for the
employer. It was thought by the labor union that section 20 prohibited an injunction against such acts, but the Supreme Court held that
such acts could be enjoined and, therefore, the legislation proposed
specifically restricts the courts in this respect unless the acts are
accompanied by fraud or violence.'

The debate in the Senate also identified "intimidation" as precisely the kind of amorphous concept that Congress declined to in-

clude in the Act as enjoinable, because "[i]f we put that language in,
we will not be changing the present law at all, and I think we will
find that exactly the same kind of practices will creep in under this

law that we found creeping in under the old system."7' Similarly, the
Senate resisted an attempt to describe the public policy of the Act as
merely reflective of past equity practice. Section 102, as proposed and

enacted, declares the policy of Norris-LaGuardia to be protection of
the interests of employees from interference by the judiciary;' the
defeated alternative, drawn from Chief Justice Taft's opinion in American Steel Foundries v. Tr-City Central Trades Council,' would

have declared the policy to be governmental neutrality consistent with
protection of the interests of both employees and employers.

69. H.R. REP. No. 669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1932) (emphasis in original).
70. 75 CONG. RFc. 4768 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1932) (remarks of Sen. Wheeler). The
Senator further stated:
Surely no reasonable person, it seems to me, could go as far as the Federal
courts have gone with reference to intimidation and coercion, because they have
simply said in many cases that if a group of men go upon a strike, that amounts
to intimidation, or if they hold a meeting in their hall, that amounts to intimidation.
A committee of the Senate went into Pennsylvania to investigate conditions
existing there during the coal strike and found that the courts had issued injunctions. They charged the strikers with intimidation, and prevented them from holding
meetings in a church, because of the fact that they claimed that the holding of a
meeting was an intimidation of the people of the town, and the other miners in
the community.
L
71. Norris-LaGuadia Act § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
72. 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
73. Senator Herbert, the proponent of this change, described it as based on Chief Justice
Taft's opinion in American Steel Foundries. 75 CONG. REc. 4677 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1932)
(statement of Sen. Herbert). See 257 U.S. at 209 for the language to which Herbert referred.
On the political journey of the bill, see Federal Anti-Injunction Act, supra note 52, at 63843.
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The message is remarkably clear. Collective activity, including
the use of pickets, is presumed to be nonviolent and lawful. Group
communication about issues in labor disputes and concerted efforts to
persuade others to cease doing business with a struck employer are
presumed to be legitimate, peaceful tactics. Injunctions are presumed
to be unnecessary to protect property rights in labor disputes. 4 And
in the rare circumstances where a petitioner's evidence overcomes
these presumptions, an injunction is to issue only against conduct
involving fraud or violence. All other means for exercising collective
rights received the imprimatur of legitimacy from Congress7
There is an additional message to be gleaned from this history.
Federal judges had used the injunction procedure to characterize collective action, whether peaceful or not, as coercive and unlawful. This
practice arose, in part, because federal courts examined picketing and
other types of collective action from the perspective of employers,
strikebreakers and an inconvenienced public. In Norris-LaGuardia,
Congress repudiated both the policy and the perspective embraced by
the federal courts, substituting instead the perspective of organized
labor and demanding that federal courts do so as well. Courts were to
recognize that self-interest, not coercion, motivated refusals to patronize struck employers. To put it bluntly, the legal discourse began to
take class into account and to assess behavior from a viewpoint sympathetic to those asserting collective rights and seeking to reduce
inequality of fortune.76
II.

ANTI-INJUNCrION LAW IN ACTION

Commentators routinely credit Norris-LaGuardia with curbing the
worst abuses of government by injunction and with getting the federal
judiciary out of the business of setting labor policy.' This assess74. S.REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1932) (finding that injunctions are sought
"for the moral effect ... in disheartening and discouraging [striking] employees ... rather

than because of any real necessity to protect property."). See also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940) (stating that otherwise peaceful picketing cannot be enjoined under the U.S.
Constitution on the presumption it will lead to violence).
75. Collective activity as such did not receive affirmative legal protection until passage
of the Wagner Act of 1935. See NLRA, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 459 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 7 (1988)).
76. Of course the courts have always taken class into account by privileging property
rights, see supra note 41, but Congress had not previously acknowledged the fact.
77. See, e.g., Benjamin Aaron, The Labor Injunction Reappraised, 10 UCLA L. REV.
292, 297, 299 (1963) ("Mhe Norris-LaGuardia Act has proved to be one of labor's greatest
and most enduring legislative victories" and "the objective of the Act's proponents ...
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ment is not wrong so much as it is incomplete. Norris-LaGuardia
may have curtailed issuance of labor injunctions by federal courts, but
the impact of federal anti-injunction legislation on labor relations
cannot be judged without reference to contemporaneous developments
which moved the locus of critical decision-making authority from
federal judges to the administrators of federal labor policy and to the
state courts. Part A examines the federal judiciary's positive response
to Norris-LaGuardia. Part B turns the focus to federal administrative
regulation of collective activity similar to that addressed in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. Part C examines the application of state antiinjunction legislation by state judges. The section concludes with an
attempt to explain why the federal bench sitting in equity acquiesced
in the new relationship between collective activity and property rights
while state judges and federal administrators did not.
A.

"[L]abor disputes as such are not at all reprobated but
encouraged, and only violence in connection
with them is forbidden"

The decisions immediately following enactment of the NorrisLaGuardia Act argue powerfully that federal judges accepted the
standards and procedures prescribed by Congress for issuing injunctions and acquiesced in the judgment that economic realities or legislative guidelines, not judicial preferences, should determine the outcome of struggles between labor and capital. This concession is instructive, in part because it illustrates the potential for reform through
law and in part because it suggests conditions necessary for such
reform to retain vitality.
Federal courts quickly endorsed the presumption of legality that
attached to collective activity by virtue of Norris-LaGuardia. The
opinion in Carter v. Herrin Motor Freight Lines, Inc.,79 describes the
change:
The language of the act is too plain and the decisions construing it
too clear cut and positive to admit of any doubt that the purpose
seemed finally to have been attained"). Edwin E. Witte reported 66 injunctions from federal
courts between 1933 and 1951, as compared to 508 federally issued labor injunctions up to
May 1931. See SUBCOMM. ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, SEN. COMM. ON LABOR &
PuBLc WELFARE, STATE COURT INUCnCTIONS, S. Doc. No. 7, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1951).
78. Carter v. Herrin Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 131 F.2d 557, 560 (5th Cir. 1942).
79. 131 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1942).
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and effect of the act, as a whole, was to give expression to, and
make effective, the policy which breathes throughout it. This policy
is that labor disputes, as such, with the assembling, the picketing,
the persuasion, the stopping of work, the enlisting of sympathy and
support, and all the other acts expressly enumerated in Sec. 104,
were no longer to be the subject of injunctive action but were, and
were expressly recognized to be, legitimate means for advancing the
interests of the working man, and, therefore, of the people as a
whole .... [That policy ... can be made fully effective only
when there is a recognition on the part of employer and employee
alike that labor disputes as such are not at all reprobated but encouraged, and only violence in connection with them is forbidden ...
Wilson & Co. v. Birl1 and L. L. Coryell & Son v. Petroleum
Workers Union, Local No. 18281' illustrate the new tolerance for

disruptive but nonviolent conduct. In Wilson, the court found picketing by union members to establish a (then lawful) closed shop
unenjoinable in the absence of violence.' The picketing consisted
generally of ten to fifteen persons, rose on one occasion to involve
ninety-seven persons, and may have constituted mass picketing in violation of state law."4 Nonetheless,

mhe words "unlawful acts" ...

do not... constitute a general
reference to anything that may be considered illegal, but apply specifically to the acts of violence which the authority of the executive
is calculated to control.'

Similarly, in L L.Coryell the court dissolved a temporary restraining
order and declined to issue an injunction against the union's effort to
secure reinstatement for two discharged employees and recognition for
the union, despite allegations that:

80. Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
81. 27 F. Supp. 915 (E.D. Pa. 1939), affd. 105 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1939).
82. 19 F. Supp. 749 (D. Minn. 1936).

83. Wilson, 27 F. Supp. 915.
84. Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105 F.2d 948, 951 (3d Cir. 1939). Courts tend to use the

term mass picketing to refer both to coordinated picketing that obstructs access temporarily
(for example a circular rotation that delays automobile access by a minute) and to mob-like
activity that interferes with egress and ingress altogether. In many opinions the term mass
picketing is used pejoratively but the actual conduct engaged in cannot be discerned since no
facts are given by the court.

85. Id at 952. Accord Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Central of Ga. Ry., 229 F.2d
901, 905 (5th Cit. 1956), cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 995 (1957).
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defendants entered into a malicious combination and conspira-

cy to destroy plaintiffs' business ...

by violence and unlawful

conduct on the plaintiffs' premises, and continuously since that date
have subjected the plaintiffs and their employees to coercion and
intimidation by picketing and by signs and placards bearing false,
misleading, and fraudulent matter; that the defendants have threatened, intimidated, and annoyed the customers of the plaintiffs; that
the defendants and others under their direction have assembled at
various times on and near the plaintiffs' place of business, have
interfered with the ingress and egress of patrons, have assaulted and
beat the employees of the plaintiffs, have used vile and indecent
language in speaking to the plaintiffs' employees, threw stones and
missiles striking the plaintiffs' buildings, pumps, and automobiles of
customers, and that on one occasion the defendants threw stench
bombs on the premises and drove customers therefrom; that since
June 29, 1936, the defendants continuously have pursued, threatened,
and harassed the employees of the plaintiffs and have tried to induce them to leave the service of the plaintiffs; and that, as a result
of the picketing and conduct of the defendants, the plaintiffs have
sustained irreparable loss and damages.'
The controversy involved a labor dispute and that settled the matter:
Norris-LaGuardia deprived the federal court of jurisdiction."
Richard H. Oswald Co. v. Leader demonstrates the careful
attention given to the structural restrictions on the use of labor injunctions imposed by Norris-LaGuardia. On the company's petition to
enjoin the continued occupation of its factory, the district court found
that the occupation satisfied the requirement of unlawful conduct but,
in contrast to the practice before 1932, the court demanded a showing
that the prerequisites of irreparable injury and an inadequate remedy
at law existed.
There was no evidence of any destruction of property or of anything
other than an unlawful detainer, which it seems to me, is compensable in damages, and, therefore, does not indicate an irreparable
injury such as would require the extraordinary remedy of an injunc-

86.
87.

L L Coryell, 19 F. Supp. at 750.
The union denied the allegations of violence, but the court's refusal to proceed was

based on its observation that sufficient facts were admitted to show that a labor dispute as
defined by Norris-LaGuardia was involved and this fact alone "brings this case within the
provisions of the [Act] and leaves this court without jurisdiction." Id. at 752.

88. 20 F. Supp. 876 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
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While there are a number of persons in the plant tion ....
there are approximately 48 or 50 - the plaintiff had no difficulty
in serving all of them, or substantially all of them, with the bill in
this case, and it may well be that an action of ejectment may furnish an adequate remedy.'
No injunction was issued.'
Finally, Newton v. Laclede Steel Co.9' shows the developing
sensitivity of the federal courts to the nuances of framing restrictions
on collective action. The record established "many acts of violence,
shooting, bombing, and disturbance" that the court characterized as
"terrorism."' In addition, a crowd of two to three hundred "violently
assaulted and injured certain employees" for a month before the issuance of a temporary restraining order.' Although approving an injunction, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's modification of the restraining order, striking out restraints on the use of profane or abusive language and restraints
against interference by threats of force or intimidation.' The only
prohibitions supported by the evidence and by the Act were restraints
on violence or threats of violence.95
However impressive the fidelity of the federal courts to the rules
laid down by Norris-LaGuardia, it would be a mistake to attribute the
reformed judicial behavior solely to enactment of federal anti-injunction legislation. With regard to labor relations, all aspects of the environment were changing, making judicial adherence to the dictates of
Norris-LaGuardia palatable. At the federal level, Congress began to
formulate a national labor policy, thereby depriving federal judges of
the claim of a regulatory void in the absence of court intervention. In

89. Id. at 877. It should also be noted that an employer can discharge occupying employees without violating the NLRA. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240,
254 (1939).
90. Id.
91. 80 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1935).
92. Id. at 638.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 637.
95. See also Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers' Local Union 591, 6 F. Supp. 164,
165 (E.D. Mich. 1934) (dismissing a suit for injunction against patrols of two or three walking in groups and persistently advising others not to patronize employer); Knapp-Monarch Co.
v. Anderson, 7 F. Supp. 332, 339 (E.D. IMl.1934) (refusing to grant an injunction against
mass picketing, instructing local police and courts that they could deal with it, although dictum suggests most picketing is enjoinable); Miller Parlor Furniture Co. v. Furniture Workers'
Indus. Union 4899, 8 F. Supp. 209 (D.NJ. 1934) (refusing to decide whether mass picketing
is enjoinable as "fraud").
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the (eventually invalidated) National Industrial Recovery Act and
(its constitutionally more secure successor) the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Congress asserted the robust legitimacy of collective activity and made explicit the value of unionization to the
economy. 8 Equally important, Congress established the National Labor Relations Board as the arbiter of the new rules for labor-management conflict, effectively substituting the judgments of an administrative agency for those of the federal courts.' At the same time, some
state legislatures expressly adopted the philosophy and details of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act in an attempt to confirm their recognition of
the lawfulness of collective activity and to take state courts out of the
business of government by injunction. Seventeen jurisdictions enacted
(and amended) little Norris-LaGuardia acts restricting the equity power of state courts in labor disputes. And finally, workers reinforced
the statutory messages by making the newly legitimized collective activity a fact of everyday industrial life. Thus, the question is not
whether the federal judiciary stopped issuing injunctions in peaceful
labor disputes. It did.1" Rather, the inquiry is whether overall legal
regulation of labor relations carried forward the reformed perceptions
of appropriate public policy with regard to collective activity and
property rights adopted in Norris-LaGuardia.

96. National Industrial Recovery Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 703 (held unconstitutional in
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
97. Ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-169 (1988)).
98. The Supreme Court reinforced the congressional message, holding in Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), that otherwise peaceful picketing cannot be enjoined under the
U.S. Constitution on the presumption that it will lead to violence. 310 U.S. at 104. By 1957,
of course, the Thornhill doctrine appeared dead. See Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354
U.S. 284 (1957). At any rate, in labor disputes NLRB regulation of picketing eliminated the
need for resolution of the constitutional status of picketing.
99. The primacy of NLRB jurisdiction over labor relations led to the preemption doctrine
that holds states have no power to regulate conduct protected or prohibited by the NLRA.
See San Diego Bldg. Trade Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
100. See supra note 77. But cf Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398
U.S. 235, 247 (stating that an injunction against peaceful strike in violation of contractual no
strike clause was not the type of activity that concerned Congress in enacting NorrisLaGuardia Act); National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 100), 29 U.S.C. § 160W) (1988)
(mandating that a regional director must seek and federal court must issue injunctions against
certain labor union activity).
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B. "[T]he making of abusive threats... equate[s]
to 'restraint and coercion

''°

Jim Atleson has ably demonstrated the perverse hold of common
law values on the minds of those enforcing federal labor law under
the NLRA." He demonstrates, beyond debate, that the NLRB and
the appellate courts have interpreted the Wagner Act's affirmation of

collective rights in a crabbed manner inconsistent with the values embraced by Congress in 1932 and 1935."ra For example, the 1938

Mackay Radio litigation"°4 established an employer's right to permanently replace economic strikers, despite the admonition in Section 13

of the Wagner Act that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed so
as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right
to strike.""m The Mackay Court blandly observed that the NLRA

does not deprive employers of "the right to protect and continue
business by supplying places left vacant by strikers .

. . .""

Atleson

comments:
Mackay' therefore, reflects a historical continuity of values reflected
in judicial opinions. The traditional judicial deference given to productivity, hierarchical control, and continued production has thus
remained significant after, as well as before, the NLRA. Mackay
can be viewed as the almost automatic response of judges raised in
an era of acknowledged managerial freedom .... Thus, one can
construct a sympathetic dialogue between benches separated by forty

101. Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1046 (1984), affrd, 765 F.2d 148
(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986).
102. VALUES AND ASsUMPTIONs, supra note 1. My understanding of the reasons for the
tenacious persistence of ideas differs somewhat from Atelson's, see infra notes 193-200 and
accompanying text, but the similarities dwarf the distinctions.
103. See also Aaron, supra note 77, at 322 (decrying "the substitution of administrative
or judicial fiat for the established law [under Norris-LaGuardia and the Railway Labor
Act]."). To Adeson's already lengthy list of cases difficult to reconcile with the language and
policy of the National Labor Relations Act, we can add Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268
N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984), aft'd, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105
(1986) (holding that mere verbal threats are adequate to deprive picketing strikers of their
right to reinstatement as unfair labor practice strikers); Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473
U.S. 95, 114 (1985) (reasoning that unions may not restrict members' right to resign because
federal labor policy is based on the concept of voluntary unionism). See VALUES AND ASSUr
MrONS, supra note 1.
104. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 201 (1936), rev'd 92 F.2d 761 (9th Cir.
1937), rev'd 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 163 (1935) (amended 1947).
106. Mackay, 304 U.S. at 345.
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years and a supposed social and legal revolution."°

And as Atleson emphasizes, the NLRB did not contest this view of
the employer's right to replace."rs
More recently, the NLRB has offered fresh evidence of the tendency to view federal labor policy from the perspective of those
skeptical about the exercise of collective rights.1" Under the NLRA,
unfair labor practice strikers and nonreplaced employees have a right
to reinstatement. 1 ' Strikers may, however, lose the reinstatement
right if they engage in unacceptable picket line behavior, including
conduct that does not involve violence."' The NLRB standard, as
set out in Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., characterizes as unacceptable
"[conduct] such that, under the circumstances existing, it may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of rights
protected under the Act.' 1 . Accordingly, verbal threats not accompanied by any further actions and occurring only during a short period
near the beginning of a four-month strike constituted "restraint and

107. VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS, supra note 1, at 29, 34 (citations and footnotes omitted).
108. Id. at 23-24. The Board did not reach this issue, but Atleson faults the General
Counsel of the NLRB for conceding the employer's right to replace economic strikers. My
understanding of the litigation strategy undertaken by the General Counsel to convince the
Supreme Court of the constitutionality of the Wagner Act suggests an alternative reading. The
Mackay strike occurred in 1935, shortly after passage of the Wagner Act. At that time the
General Counsel of the NLRB was struggling to find the appropriate case to test the constitutionality of the new law and was also unwilling to argue for a reading of the statute not
required by the facts of a particular case. See PETER IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 26271 (1982). Since the General Counsel could litigate the Mackay case on the question of
discrimination in choosing among strikers, the Board did not have to confront the broader
question of whether § 13 restricts an employer's authority to hire replacements. Consistent
with its policy of presenting cases under the new law to the Supreme Court in as factually
appealing and narrow a posture as possible, the General Counsel understandably highlighted
the fact of discrimination and avoided the thorny issue of the extent to which the new statutory rights limited pre-existing employer prerogatives. My knowledge of Supreme Court politics is inadequate to allow serious speculation on the justices' desire in 1938 to read the
Wagner Act narrowly in order to forestall a political reversal. I can note, however, that succeeding decisions have softened the impact of the Mackay replacement rule. See NLRB v.
Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); Laidlaw Corp., 171 N.L.R.B. 1366 (1968), aff'd,
414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
109. Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984), aff'd, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. denie4 474 U.S. 1105 (1986).
110. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
111. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. 1044.
112. Id. at 1046. See also Tube Craft, Inc. 287 N.L.R.B. 491 (1987) (blocking access to
employer's facility is strike misconduct justifying termination and forfeiture of reinstatement
rights). But see Sears, Roebuck. & Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 193 (1991) (holding that the employer
did not violate Act when it told employees that the union "might send someone out to break
their legs in order to collect dues").
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coercion' and allowed the employer to refuse to reinstate a three-year
employee. 1 '3 The Board reasoned that "the making of abusive threats
against nonstriking employees equates to 'restraint and coercion'
even in the absence of accompanying physical acts because "[a] serious threat may draw its credibility from the surrounding circumstanc-

es and not from the physical gestures of the speaker.1 ..4
At first instance, the standard adopted in Clear Pine Mouldings

may appear sensible. No employee, whether on strike or not, is privileged to engage in physical assault. But the Board moves from this

unassailable proposition to the assumption that verbal threats "equate
to restraint and coercion." It is naive at best to assert that Congress,
in authorizing use of collective action, anticipated peaceful patrolling

unaccompanied by a "rough incident or a moment of animal exuberance." 15 As earlier Board decisions expressly acknowledged, "minor

acts of misconduct must have been in the contemplation of Congress
when it provided for the right to strike ... "" While the strike

environment does not make criminal conduct lawful, Sections 7 and
13 of the NLRA can yield the conclusion that abusive threats "unaccompanied by action" and only occurring at a strike's beginning

would leave an employer "woefully without justification in contending
that [the employee] engaged in disqualifying conduct.11 7 What the
Board in Clear Pine Mouldings, is really telling employers is that
fifty years after enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia and Wagner Acts,

it is once again legitimate to deny jobs to persons who express them113. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1046-48, 1054. Another employee lost § 7
protection because of a single incident during the first week of the strike in which he hammered on a truck with a two foot club. Since physical misconduct has traditionally disqualified strikers from reinstatement, see Coronet Casuals, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 304 (1973), the
Board could have upheld this denial of reinstatement without articulating a new standard.
114. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1046 (quoting Associated Grocers of New
England, Inc. v. NLRB, 562 F.2d 1333, 1336 (1st Cir. 1977)). The verbal threats were addressed to nonstriking workers who arguably could evaluate the credibility of the rhetoric in
light of their previous and ongoing work relationships with the speakers. Compare Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 193 (1991) (holding that violation of Act by employer may
not be predicated on disparaging remarks alone).
115. Milk Wagon Drivers, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293
(1941).
116. Coronet Casuals, Inc., 207 N.L.R.B. 304, 305 (1973), quoted in Clear Pine
Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1045.
117. Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 N.L.R.B. at 1061 (AJ decision). See also the legislative
history discussed supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text. The Clear Pine Mouldings'
Board offered as its sole reason for rejection of the earlier standard: "We disagree with this
standard because actions such as the making of abusive threats against nonstriking employees
equate to 'restraint and coercion' prohibited elsewhere in the Act and are not privileged by
Section 8(c) of the Act." 268 N.L.R.B. at 1046.
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selves openly, perhaps recklessly, about the importance of their working conditions.' 8 Equally unsettling is the frank invitation to employers to rid themselves of strong unionists whose threats of retaliation are understood
by all, employers and co-workers alike, to be
19
hyperbolic.
To the extent that the NLRB and judges interpreting the NLRA
offer no legal protection for traditional forms of labor protest, claims
about the success of federal legislation like Norris-LaGuardia must be
tempered." Federal courts may no longer issue injunctions against
nonviolent conduct in labor disputes, but the unimpeded exercise of
collective rights anticipated by the Norris-LaGuardia Act may nonetheless be an illusion. Unease in this regard is deepened if injunctions
against nonviolent picketing are obtainable in state courts. The withdrawal of equity jurisdiction at. the federal level would then accomplish only a change of forum, not a change of attitude or outcome.
C.

"The picketers intimidated some nonstriking employees who
attempted to enter the plant by subjecting 2them
to verbal abuse and to verbal threats"1 '

Close analysis of judicial interpretation of one jurisdiction's antiinjunction legislation, followed by a survey of injunction activity in
states with similar laws, illustrates how plus ca change... la meme
chose when collective and property rights conflict.
Connecticut enacted its little Norris-LaGuardia Act" in 1939

118.

Clear Pine Mouldings is part of a recent trend in Board and court decisions that

reassert the pre-Wagner Act picture of ambiguous conduct by workers as potentially threatening. See Eileen Silverstein, The Meaning of Encounters at the Workplace: Sexual Harassment

and Solidarity (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
119. See Precision Window Mfg. v. NLRB, 963 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1992) (denying reinstatement to an employee who, in the course of protesting the legality of a discharge, said he
would return to kill the responsible supervisor).
120. See id. (denying reinstatement to an employee who protested the legality of a discharge and said he would kill the supervisor); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County
Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 208, 212 (1978) (Justices Blackmun and Powell,
concurring, observing that trespassory picketing may promote violence); and DeBartolo Corp.
v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 578 (1988) (Justice
White, writing, for the Court, dicta to the effect that handbills persuade while pickets intimidate).
121. Emart Indus., Inc. v. UAW Local 376, 461 A.2d 422, 426 (Conn. 1983).
122. CoNN.
N. STAT. §§ 31-112 to 31-121a (1993). For the practitioners' perspective
on the Connecticut statute, see Reginald L. Babcock, Connecticut State Court Injunctions in
Labor Disputes, 54 CoNN. BJ. 37 (1980) (advocating aggressive use of labor injunctions
under the Connecticut law); Bertram Diamond, Labor Injunctions in Connecticut State Courts:
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and is typical of states with such laws. The text of the statute is
closely patterned after the Norris-LaGuardia Act; the state supreme
court has identified the purpose of the law to be similar to that of its
federal counterpart, taking "courts out of the labor injunction business
except in... very limited circumstances... "; and state judges
are invited to examine federal decisions for guidance in interpreting

the provisions of the anti-injunction act."'
The authoritative application of Connecticut's law is found in
Emhart Industries, Inc. v. UAW, Local 376, a paradigmatic case decided by a unanimous state supreme court in 19 83 ." The UAW and

Emhart Industries had a long term relationship when their collective
bargaining agreement expired on September 12, 1982."2 The union
struck and began round-the-clock picketing on Monday, September

13.12 Within forty-eight hours, Emhart petitioned for a temporary
restraining order and temporary injunction."' After holding hearings

from Friday, September 17, to Tuesday, October 5, a superior court
judge issued the temporary injunction drafted by Emhart's attorneys."3 The order, upheld by the state supreme court, instructed the

Another View, 54 CONN. BJ. 244 (1980) (advocating negotiations between union, employer
and police to set the rules of conduct during a strike).
123. One important difference is the wording of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-113, withdrawing
the jurisdiction of state courts, to enjoin "giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts
involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking or patrolling or by any other
lawful method." CoNN. GEM. STAT. § 31-113 (emphasis added). The federal counterpart uses
the language "or by any other method not involving fraud or violence." 29 U.S.C. § 104(e)
(1988) (emphasis added). This difference in language has not been relied on by Connecticut
courts interpreting the statute. As of 1967, when the law was amended to include a requirement of proof that public officers were unable or unwilling to provide adequate protection,
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-115 contains the same procedural and substantive conditions for issuing
an injunction as § 7 of Norris-LaGuardia.
124. Emhart, 461 A.2d at 433 (internal quotes and citation omitted).
125. l Although a footnote in Emhart seems to limit the relevant federal decisions to
those of the Supreme Court ("because our statutes are similar to the federal statute, the interpretation of the latter by the United States Supreme Court is deemed 'particularly pertinent'
in construing our own statute." IL at 433 n.12) (citations omitted), the text of the Emhart
opinion cites decisions from the United States Courts of Appeals as well as from the Supreme Court.
126. Emhart Indus., Inc. v. UAW Local 376, 461 A.2d 422 (Conn. 1983). The development of the law before and after Emhart is consistent with the opinion in Emhart, both as to
result and as to style. Like most jurisdictions, Connecticut has a small number of reported
cases, there being little reason to appeal from a temporary injunction. See supra notes 18-20
and accompanying text.
127. Id. at 424.
128. Id.
129. IaL
130. Id.As is customary in cases where a labor injunction is sought, the lawyers for
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union, its members, officers, agents, employees and all others acting
in concert with them to refrain from:
A. Congregating in mass and engaging in mass picketing, or
otherwise in close formation around the entrance... to the
[company's] premises... in such a way as to block said entrance
and prevent, interfere with or impede entrance into or egress from
said premises ...
B. By force, violence or intimidation, or threat of force or violence, or by the use of offensive language or gestures, impeding or
interfering with the [company's] officers or employees, persons
doing business with the [company] or members of the public who
may wish to enter or leave the [company's] premises.
C. [Miaintaining more than ten (10) picketers who shall maintain two yards intervals between them at the entrance to the
[company's] premises.
D. Threatening or intimidating employees or officers of the
[company] or members of their families, and threatening to damage
or injure the property of [anyone] doing business with the [company] in any manner."'
As characterized by the court, the evidence supporting these
restrictions established delays in getting into and out of the plant, and
intimidation."' As to the delays, the testimony persuaded the court

Emhart submitted a proposed temporary injunction along with the original complaint. The
terms of the injunction as issued a month later did not vary from that of the proposed order,
except that the plaintiff's request for no more than five pickets separated by at least three
yards was modified to allow no more than ten pickets separated by at least two yards. Record on Appeal.
131. l at 424 n.1. The trial court also enjoined the union, etc. from "[i]nterfering in any
way with the operation of plaintiff's business." Id. at 441. The Connecticut Supreme Court
struck this paragraph of the injunction as impermissibly broad. Although the overbroad paragraph was in effect from October 13, 1982 (the date the temporary injunction was issued) to
at least June 14, 1983 (the date of the supreme court's Emhart decision), this paragraph of
the injunction is unlikely to have affected the union's conduct, since the remaining features
of the injunction upheld by the supreme court addressed all conduct the union was found to
have engaged in or would have been likely to engage in between October 1982 and June
1983.
132. Id. at 435 (stating that "[t]he state interest justifying judicial action is Emhart's right
to the reasonable use and free access to its property. In the present case, the striking employees effectively usurped Emhart's right to determine when the nonstriking employees
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that:
. the union set up circular picket lines of ten to thirty persons at
the entrance to the company's premises and let cars pass through
only after the pickets had engaged in a complete rotation;
* employees lost 1248 hours of work during the first week of the
strike and experienced delays of up to two hours particularly during
rush hours, all caused by the picketing; and
* the rate at which the vehicles were permitted to pass through the
picket line caused the traffic to back up for a number of blocks
impeding traffic on streets adjoining the plant.133
As to intimidation, the court found that:
The picketers intimidated some nonstriking employees who
attempted to enter the plant by subjecting them to verbal abuse and
to verbal threats. In addition, one employee testified that he observed a picketer copying down the license plate numbers of the
cars that drove through the picket line. There was also evidence of
individual acts of violence and vandalism. At one point,...

about

fifty picketers surrounded a nonstriking employee's blue Honda
automobile and jumped up and down on it, kicked its sides, pounded on the roof, scratched some paint off and cracked its windshield,
and also verbally threatened the driver. This incident led to the
arrest of one of the picketers."3
The Emhart court undertook a scrupulous examination of the
statutory requirements for issuing the injunction, including extensive
case citations and application of the facts to each requirement. As to
every condition, however, the opinion suggests a turn of mind wholly
at odds with the philosophy of the statute.135 On the critical question

would get into the plant to work.").

133. Id. at 426.
134. Id The incident of the blue Honda occurred after the police, who had been escorting
employees that morning, left their position at the driveway. A picketer testified that the employee arrived after peak traffic hours and was told by an officer, 'Well, you're on your
own now." Id. at 428 n.7.
135. It is my purpose to demonstrate the persistence of ideas, rather than to chastise the
Emhart court or second-guess the tactical decisions of counsel to the parties. Accordingly,
this section of the article will discuss the primary cases on which the court appears to have
relied but will not address every case in the lengthy string citations provided by the court. It
should be noted, however, that the Emhart court cites the relatively few Connecticut cases
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of what constitutes unlawful activity, the opinion follows the curious
course of citing cases decided before passage of the anti-injunction

laws while ignoring relevant legislative history." Mass picketing
and interference with access to the plant are identified as unlawful
acts on the strength of American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central
Trades Council."3 American Steel Foundries is, of course, the 1921
United States Supreme Court decision limiting the number of pickets
to one at each gate because the very name picket is "sinister," and
"indicate[s] a militant purpose... inconsistent with peaceful persuasion," and because groups of pickets present "a necessary element of
intimidation.""

The "spoken threats" and "moral intimidation" em-

ployed by the Emhart strikers are found to be unlawful on the
strength of Levy & Devaney, Inc. v. International Pocketbook
Workers' Union, a pre-enactment Connecticut case finding intimidation in the absence of force or physical violence because nonstrikers
were compelled to pass through strikers giving them "black and
threatening looks" which could "overawe and make them afraid.""' 9

The assumptions reflected in American Steel Foundries and Levy &
Devaney, and the attitudes that they foster, are what prompted Con-

decided between the 1940's and 1970's under the anti-injunction legislation. Each of these
cases in turn relies on cases decided before enactment of the legislation, particularly American
Steel Foundries and Levy & Devaney, discussed infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
As Mary McCune commented on reading these decisions, "The Connecticut court seems frozen in time." Accord Benjamin Aaron, Labor Injunctions In the State Courts - Part 11: A
Critique, 50 VA. L. REv. 1147, 1152 (1964) [hereinafter State Courts - Part II].
136. The Connecticut legislature did not preserve debates on pending bills. Given the
similarity in language to the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the state court's invocation of federal
cases as aids in interpreting the Connecticut law, the relevant legislative history is that of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.
137. 257 U.S. 184 (1921), cited in Emhart 461 A.2d at 434 (quoting Anaconda Co. v.
UAW, 382 A.2d 544 (Conn. 1977)). The Connecticut case in the string citation that follows
also relies on the discredited American Steel Foundries decision and asserts that "[t]he boundary between lawful and unlawful conduct is that between peaceful persuasion and intimidation." Turner & Seymour Mfg. v. Torrington Foundry Workers Local 1699, 18 Conn. Supp.
73, 76, 78 (1952). But see Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers' Local 591, 6 F. Supp.
164, 171 (E.D. Mich. 1934) (holding that § 4 of Norris-LaGuardia was intended to overrule
American Steel Foundries).
138. American Steel Foundries, 257 U.S. at 205, 207. See also Hellerstein, supra note 30
(establishing that the decision in American Steel Foundries is the basis for condemning mass
picketing in this country).
139. Levy & Devaney, Inc. v. International Pocketbook Workers' Union, 158 A. 795, 796
(Conn. 1932). The court cited Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896), discussed
supra at notes 31, 32 and 39, for this proposition. Even if a "black look" could have inspired fear in 1932, a black look or moral intimidation on a peacefully conducted picket line
in 1983 cannot be said to have "the coercive effect of a hand on a gun butt." See Jones,
supra note 34, at 1030.
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gress and the Connecticut Legislature to enact anti-injunction laws.
Indeed the legislative history of Norris-LaGuardia speaks directly to
the issue: "Mass picketing, intimidations, trailing, besetting, importuning, libeling, and false statements are to be beyond the reach of
injunctive relief';"4 intimidation or threats are concepts that "would
simply give judges a pretense to destroy labor's rights";" and
"[i]njunctions are often applied for and issued for the moral effect
that such injunctions will have in disheartening and discouraging
employees engaged in a strike, rather than because of any real necessity to protect property.""4
A principled application of
Connecticut's anti-injunction measure would appear to preclude the
analysis offered in Emhart.43

In addition to the curious reliance on outdated jurisprudence to
establish unlawful conduct, the Emhart opinion takes a decidedly
uncritical approach to the structural limitations on the exercise of
equitable power. In discussing the often-joined elements of irreparable
injury and inadequacy of a remedy at law, Emhart explains that
"[w]hether damages are to be viewed by a court of equity as 'irreparable' or not depends more upon the nature of the right which is
injuriously affected than upon the pecuniary measure of the loss suffered .... .'1" While this proposition may be sound, it does little to
advance our understanding of irreparability and the need for an injunction in the Emhart situation or in any other labor dispute. The
court's primary citation, to Hammerburg v. Leinert," is particularly
unhelpful in this regard. The statute under consideration in

140. 75 CONG. REc. 5471 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1932) (statement of Rep. Beck) (emphasis
added). Although Rep. Beck opposed the legislation, his statement is routinely cited as evi-

dence that mass picketing was to be unenjoinable, even by contemporary critics of NorrisLaGuardia. See, e.g., Haggard, supra note 7, at 525 n.88. The Connecticut Supreme Court
fails to note this legislative history or to identify the distinctions between the federal and

state laws that would permit a different interpretation of the state law. In fairness, most state
courts find mass picketing andlor blocking access to be enjoinable, see infra note 174 and

accompanying text.
141. 75 CONG. REc. 5507 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1932) (statement of Rep. Celler).
142. S.REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1932). This observation echoes that of
Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 368 (1921) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting) (stating that the injunction is not sought "to prevent property from being injured nor to protect the owner in its
use, but to endow property with active, militant power which would make it dominant over

men.").
143.

Cf.Benjamin Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts -

Part I: A Survey, 50

VA. L. REv. 951 at 977-80 (1964) [hereinafter State Courts - Part 1] (discussing the types
of conduct enjoined in the six states he studied).

144. Emhart, 461 A.2d at 438.
145.

Hammerberg v. Leinert, 46 A.2d 420 (Conn. 1946).
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Hammerburg explicitly mandated injunctive relief, the Connecticut
legislature having determined for itself that a damage remedy could
never achieve compliance with a law setting price levels for milk."
It is difficult to see how a legislative determination that an injunction
is always necessary to enforce regulatory laws can aid in interpreting
the terms of a contrary legislative judgment, that an injunction should
rarely be relied on to redress injuries in labor disputes since monetary
and criminal sanctions are adequate.147
Moreover, the evidence of irreparable injury and inadequate legal
remedies was equivocal at best. The court wrote of the "ongoing"
loss of access to Emhart's property" and attributed the delays of up
to two hours, the traffic back ups in the neighborhood of the plant,
and the 1248 hours of lost work during the first week of the strike to
the picketing." But picketing was not the only factor restricting
easy access to the plant. Prior to the strike Emhart employees, suppliers and customers could use any of four entrances to the plant, two
on Day Hill Road and two on Addison Road."O Emhart closed all
but one entrance once the strike began, and that entrance opened on
to heavily traveled Day Hill Road."' The traffic delays and lost
hours attributed to the circular rotations were, therefore, in part created by the company's own activities."
Another telling oddity appears in the passage on weighing the
equities. The court had no difficulty finding in favor of Emhart since
only unlawful conduct was being enjoined, and "picketing and/or
violence which would interfere with the use of Emhart's property [is]
activity which we have held unlawful."' 3 The problem, of course, is
that picketing always interferes with access, and jurisdictions adopting
anti-injunction legislation have accepted that reality." Unless the
146. Id.
147. Robertson v. Lewie, 59 A. 409 (Conn. 1904) cited by the Hammerburg court, is
similarly inapposite. Irreparable injury in that case flowed from the defendant's obstructing
access to an outlet used by the plaintiff for 50 years, where the obstruction rendered
plaintiff's land permanently unusable for certain purposes. Nothing in Emhart suggested this
magnitude of harm.
148. Emhart, 461 A.2d at 438.

149. Id. Thus, the injunction against "mass picketing" and the restriction to ten picketers
separated by at least two yards.
150.

Id. at 425.

151. Id.
152. The court considered a theory of contributory responsibility but rejected it in favor
of an either/or analysis. Id. at 438 n.17. Note also that the evidence of delay dealt with rush
hours, but the injunction is not limited to certain hours or days.
153. Id. at 439.
154.

Cf Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol11/iss1/3

32

Silverstein: Collective Action, Property Rights and Law Reform: The Story of t
1993]

The Story of the Labor Injunction

strike in Emhart gave rise to pervasive intimidation and violence, the
balancing suggested by the court would justify a broad-based injunction in any situation involving picketing, signalling a return to the
traditional deference given to property rights. Indeed the facts in
Emhart confirm this intuition. The only evidence offered in support
of the claims of force, intimidation, coercion or threats thereof consisted of the rotational picketing, "noting" license plate numbers,
unspecified verbal abuse and verbal threats to occupants of automobiles, and the incident involving damage to the blue Honda."'5 As
we have seen, however, only the assault on the blue Honda involves
unlawful conduct as that phrase is contemplated by the statute.1"
Realistically then, strikers and their supporters were enjoined from engaging in a considerable amount of lawful, expressive conduct on the
basis of a single violent incident in the course of round-the-clock
picketing that lasted over three weeks."

What explains the inferences and assumptions about the harmful
consequences of collective activity found in the Emhart decision?"

The opinion is neither sloppy nor devious. Instead, the decision suggests the unconscious return to "the habits you are trained in, the
people with whom you mix,

. .

a certain class of ideas of such a

nature that, when you have to deal with other ideas, you do not give
as sound and accurate a judgment as you would wish."'59 The pic-

287, 293 (1941) (stating that "the right of free speech cannot be denied by drawing from a
trivial rough incident or a moment of animal exuberance the conclusion that otherwise
peaceful picketing has the taint of force"); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett Dist. Council
of Lumber Workers, 119 P.2d 643 (Wash. 1941) (stating that more than threats of violence
inherent in mass picketing are needed for an injunction against all picketing; it requires damage or destruction of property or assault upon persons).
155. Emhart, 461 A.2d at 428. The court uses a good deal of ink to link individual
union officers to these events and to explain why the police could not contain the union's
conduct in the absence of an injunction. This exercise makes it seem as though a larger
number of incidents took place but the court is only using the same evidence to establish the
separate statutory requirements.
156. See id. (reporting that this incident occurred at a time when police chose not to
insure public safety).
157. The Emhart strikers returned to work after six months but it took three-and-a-half
additional years to negotiate a contract. Both Sides Welcome New Emhart Contract, HARTFORD CouRANT, July 10, 1986.
158. The restrictions imposed by the Emhart injunction became the boiler plate language
sought by employer counsel in Connecticut. Presentation by Burton B. Kainen, counsel to
Emhart, to the labor law seminar at the University of Connecticut, Spring 1991.
159. The language is that of Lord Justice Scrutton in 1921. The Work of the Commercial
Courts, 1 CAIm. L.J 6, 8, quoted in FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 14, at 132. See
also Howard Zinn, The Conspiracy of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 15, 33 (Robert Paul Wolff
ed., 1971) ("[The judge's] environment is limited: a splendid city apartment, a home in the
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ture drawn by the company of a situation out-of-control mirrored the
image of labor disputes held by the judges. The phrase mass picketing inspires visions of violence in the middle-class imagination so any
picketing thus labeled must be unlawful; circular rotations contribute
to delays and continuing losses so the harm to capital must be irreparable. Case authority and reasoning that conform to these impressions
simply make sense to judges hearing actions for injunctions in labor
disputes, even when the case authority and reasoning have been explicitly repudiated by state and federal legislation.
The experience in Connecticut is in no way unique. Studies of
the use of labor injunctions in other states find a similar pattern of
continued reverence for property rights along with grudging acknowledgement of collective rights."ta Ben Aaron examined injunctions
issued before 1964 in connection with labor disputes in six states,
California, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Wisconsin," as well as the injunction practice in Los Angeles County
from January 1946 to July 1950.' 62 Aaron reported a significant decline in ex parte restraining orders, but otherwise observed that many
of the practices associated with government by injunction survived the
shift in public policy represented by Norris-LaGuardia."6 "Injunctions are still, for the most part, drawn up by the successful
complainant's attorney, and... many of their prohibitions are sweeping in scope and are written in traditional legal mumbo-jumbo or in
such vague terms that the average man must find them difficult if not
impossible to understand.""' This conclusion was reflected both in
the states governed by little Norris-LaGuardia acts and in jurisdictions
like California and Texas where labor disputes were subject to the
state's general standards for issuing injunctions."

country, the courtroom itself. The world of anguish, of social protest, is a threatening dark
form on his window shade.").
160. For an early, critical assessment of state court compliance with anti-injunction legislation, see Note, Current Legislative and Judicial Restriction on State Labor Injunction Acts, 53
YALE LJ. 553 (1944).
161. State Courts - Part I, supra note 143. Although Aaron described the' selection process as arbitrary, he also notes that the six states represent a fair cross-section of the American economy and share the common experiences of vigorous labor activity and labor-management disputes. Id. at 955.
162. Benjamin Aaron & William Levin, Labor Injunctions in Action: A Five-Year Survey
in Los Angeles County, 39 CAL. L. REV. 42 (1951).
163. State Courts - Part II, supra note 135, at 1149-52.
164. L at 1152.

165. In 1975, California adopted a state labor relations law, the Moscone Act, CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 527.3 (West 1979) (barring injunctions against peaceful picketing). But the
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Aaron also observed "a distinct similarity between labor injunctions issued by a court and cease-and-desist orders issued by a state
labor relations board or commission [enforcing a state labor relations
law.]" 1 The Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, for example,
operates under a state labor relations law much like the National
Labor Relations Act and in the shadow of Wisconsin's little NorrisLaGuardia Act."° Against this background the Wisconsin Board issued a cease-and-desist order against "[e]ngaging in, promoting, or
inducing picketing at or near" the employees' place of employment or
"[cioercing, intimidating, or attempting to induce, the complainant... to recognize the respondent union ...."" Whatever the
forum and despite a state's explicit endorsement of union activity, assumptions about the illegitimacy of collective action and the sanctity
of property rights persisted."'
Jim Atleson reached a similar conclusion in his study of the
legal culture in which attorneys litigate and settle injunction actions
involving picketing.' Atleson found that:
injunction practice does not appear to have changed since Aaron's study. See Kaplan's Fruit
& Produce Co. v. Superior Court, 603 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1979). Accord M Restaurants, Inc. v.
San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 177 Cal. Rptr. 690, 702 (CL
App. 1981) (upholding injunction that specified limit of three picketers per entrance and
prohibited "Ce]ngaging in loud boisterous shouting, yelling, and/or other noises and activities,
to disturb the peace at Plaintiff's place of business.").
166. State Courts - Part H, supra note 135, at 1159.
167. Id at 1160-61.
168. Id at 1159-60; the board also enjoined secondary boycott activity. Aaron, unwilling
to conclude that prejudice against labor organizations or picketing dictated these substantive
decisions, argues that procedural aspects of the process make injunctions unsuitable as remedies for unlawful conduct in labor disputes. Drawing on his considerable experience, Aaron
compares the information available to judges with that provided labor arbitrators (an arbitrator
may hear too much that is irrelevant but not enough that is relevant, while the rules of evidence will mean that a court may not hear much that is irrelevant but will also exclude
much that is relevant). Id at 1156-57. Thus, Aaron concludes "that many temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions are improperly issued, not because the judge is prejudiced, but because he is insufficiently informed ... In a great many, if not the majority, of
cases ... . the restraining order or preliminary injunction spells defeat for the defendant's
cause. Every objective study of injunctions in action since the publication of the pioneer
work by Frankfurter and Greene has noted this result. Such a result is wrong, not because
we can be sure that the defendant's cause is just and its objectives lawful--they frequently
are not-but because the judicial power has been used prematurely and unfairly to aid one
party to a private dispute." hId at 1157-58.
169. Reported cases since 1964 are consistent. See supra note 165 (California); Howard
Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, 848 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1988) (Texas); Altemose Constr.
Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 296 A.2d 504 (Pa.1972). Massachusetts and Wisconsin have few published cases since 1964. New York cases are discussed infra notes 17072 and accompanying text.
170. James B. Atieson, The Legal Community and the Transformation of Disputes: The
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a literal reading [of New York's anti-injunction statute] would make
it extremely difficult to obtain any injunctive relief, [but] the decisions have often required merely a proforna allegation and finding,
especially where "violent" union activity has been alleged to exist.
In many instances... [New York law's] requirements are recited
and, without explanation, deemed satisfied."'

Indeed, a frequently quoted judicial passage actually contradicts the
statute by equating picketing and coercion: "picketing to be peaceful
must be free, not only of violence, but also free of any intimidation,
free of any form of physical obstruction or interference."'" And,
with regard to the required finding of irreparable injury, Atleson
found that "courts frequently focus not on the damage the violent or
mass picketing was or will be responsible for but on the economic
damage the labor dispute has caused as a whole .... Such a focus
renders the 'substantial and irreparable injury' requirement a minor
hurdle if the union's activity is at all effective."'"
My own reading of cases from the twenty-four jurisdictions with
anti-injunction laws confirms Aaron's and Atleson's findings."
Many decisions resemble that in Emhart, with the courts referring
explicitly to the changes wrought by anti-injunction legislation and
then proceeding to hold nonviolent activity unlawful on grounds reminiscent of pre-enactment philosophy. A New Jersey appellate court,
for example, condemned temporary obstruction of automobile access
on a few occasions as "exercising dominion over the gate" and as
"continuous trespasses" which historically evoke the protective decree
of chancery, despite the absence of any violent activity and despite
the company's tactic of creating traffic jams by blocking access with
supervisors' automobiles.75 An Illinois appellate court affirmed the
grant of a temporary injunction against peaceful picketing and against
Settlement of Injunction Actions, 23 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 41 (1989). See also JACOB
SEIDENBERO, THE LABOR INjuNCTION IN NEw YORK CrrY, 1935-1950 (1953).

171. Atleson, supra note 170, at 48.
172. Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Triangle Finishing Corp. v. Textile Workers
Union of Am., 145 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (Sup. Ct. 1955)). See also, State Courts - Part I,
supra note 143, at 978.
173. Atleson, supra note 170, at 47. Accord Aaron and Levin, supra note 162, at 49
("irreparable injury' is given so broad a definition as to render the distinction between it and
less serious damage virtually meaningless.").
174. I refer to decisions issued since 1960 and reported in the annotated state codes,
LEXIS and WESTLAW.

175. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. United Steelworkers, 157 A.2d 542, 551, 554
(NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1960). This opinion bears an eerie resemblance to that in Emhart.
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statements to the effect that continued business relations with a com-

pany would result in picketing, because the picketing and statements
were "a means of economic coercion.""17 The California Supreme
Court found that picketing which obstructed consumer access was
enjoinable, despite passage in 1975 of the Moscone Act limiting

equitable relief against peaceful picketing." Because the record contained no evidence of violence, threats of violence, or inability of

local authorities to control the strikers, a concurring justice lamented:
It is disappointing that the Supreme Court of California, after more
than half a century and notwithstanding the recent, plausibly incompatible, California legislative history, now appends this decision to
the judicial history that Messrs. Frankfurter and Greene in 1930
assailed so17 graphically and devastatingly in their book The Labor
Injunction.

8

With regard to the procedural safeguards at the heart of anti-

injunction laws, trial judges still ignore the most basic requirements
(if appellate reports provide an accurate record). 79 For example, an
Illinois appellate court vacated a temporary restraining order issued

without notice to the union whose members were picketing the
employer's plant;1" an Indiana appeals court recently dismissed a

176. Twin City Barge & Towing Co. v. Licensed Tugmens' Protective Ass'n, 197 N.E.2d
749, 755 (IMI.
App. CL 1964) cited with approval in Dinoffria v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 72 N.E.2d 635 (I1. App. CL 1947), writ dismissed, 77 N.E.2d 661 (1948), cert. denied
335 U.S. 815 (stating that "even where there was no violence in the sense of physical assault or destruction of property, statements and actions of a threatening nature, which amounted to attempts to intimidate, will also be enjoined, and such threats and intimidation have
been implied from conduct and demeanor as well as from spoken words.").
177. Kaplan's Fruit & Produce Co. v. Superior Court, 603 P.2d 1341, 1352 (Cal. 1979).
178. Ia at 1357 (Newman, J., concurring). See also Bertuccio v. Superior Court, 173 Cal.
Rptr. 411 (Ct. App. 1981) (issuing injunction where picketing aimed at employers); M Restaurants, Inc. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary Workers, 177 Cal. Rptr.
690, 702 (CL App. 1981) (issuing injunction against "engaging in loud boisterous shouting,
yelling, and/or other noises and activities to disturb the peace at Plaintiff's place of business"); International Molders Union, Local 164 v. Superior Court, 138 Cal. Rptr. 794, 798
(Ct. App. 1977) (holding that the Moscone Act does not change common law of injunction,
merely enacts it).
179. It is impossible to say whether these instances of procedural defects are routine or
rare, because injunction orders are appealed infrequently. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text. My point is not that all trial courts fail to follow statutory procedures, but a
more modest one, that significant decision-makers continue to hold and act upon pre-statutory
attitudes toward collective action.
180. Bettendorf-Stanford Bakery Equip. Co. v. UAW Local 1906, 363 N.E.2d 867 (1.
App. Ct. 1977). See also Lindsey Tavern v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 307, 125
A.2d 207 (R.I. 1956); LeSabre Corp. v. Barnette, 411 So. 2d 739 (La. Ct. App. 1982); Na-
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permanent injunction issued without hearing testimony under oath and
without making any statutorily-required findings of fact on the the

adequacy of police protection and the balance of interests protected
by granting or denying relief;' 8' and a Louisiana court set aside a

preliminary injunction issued on the strength of the court's asserted
police power "to prevent violence before it occurs" and without any
reference to the state's anti-injunction law.'" Procedural irregularities
also continue in jurisdictions where labor disputes are subject to a
state's general injunction laws. In Texas, employer growers hired

local criminal district attorneys as civil counsel to secure injunctive
relief against a union of striking agricultural workers.'" The district

attorneys had the power under state law to bring criminal actions
against the workers for the same conduct that was the object of the
civil action seeking a temporary restraining order.'" In a subsequent
conspiracy action against the employers and state and local officials,
Judge Higginbotham mused that "the two-hatted lawyers who obtained

enforcement here have revived an earlier practice of using state court
injunctions to bust unions.""l

In many of the jurisdictions with anti-injunction laws appellate
courts do not appear to have authoritatively applied their statutes,"

in part because appeals are rarely taken on the issuance of labor

tional Union of Hospital Employees, Dist. 1199E v. Lafayette Square Nursing Ctr., Inc., 368
A.2d 1099, 1107 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (stating that a section of state law requiring
petitioner to attempt to settle labor dispute before seeking injunction "sets forth a condition
precedent to equitable relief, that chancellors may not ignore, no matter how loudly the other
facts seem to cry out for such relief.").
181. International Alliance Theatrical Stage Employees v. Sunshine Promotions, Inc., 555
N.E.2d 1309 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). See also Teamsters Local No. 297 v. Air-Flow Sheet
Metal, Inc., 240 N.E.2d 830 (Ind. CL App. 1968); Jones v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 308
N.E.2d 512 (Mass. 1974); U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. United Steelworkers Local 2026, 157
A.2d 542 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1960); PHK-P, Inc. v. United Food Workers, Local 23,
554 A.2d 519 (Pa. Super. CL), appeal denied, 565 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1989).
182. Coastal Cargo Co. v. General Longshore Workers Local 3000, 478 So. 2d 169, 170
(La. CL App.), writ not considered by 479 So. 2d 919 (La. 1985).
183. Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 848 F.2d 544, 549 (5th Cir.
1988).
184. Id
185. Id at 567 (Higginbotham, P., concurring). See also Kaplan's Fruit & Produce Co. v.
Superior Court, 603 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1979), discussed supra note 177.
186. The jurisdictions I include as appearing to have little or no authoritative review are:
Arizona. Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, Wisconsin (but see supra note 182 and accompanying text), Utah (also preemption found)
and Wyoming (also preemption found). Significant parts of Washington's statute were declared unconstitutional. See Blanchard v. Golden Age Brewing Co., 63 P.2d 397 (Wash.
1936).
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injunctions and in part because state courts find federal preemption by
the NLRA. It is therefore difficult to identify with certainty the circumstances under which injunctions do issue, but the limited evidence
is not reassuring. An Arizona Superior Court, enjoined, inter alia,
"[ulsing insulting, obscene or abusive language, remarks and/or gestures or shouting yelling or making loud noises in a manner directly
tending to the disturbance of the peace."1" In New York, a court
enjoined picketing of a plant that was closing on the ground that
there was no labor dispute.1" In Maine and Oregon a strict
mootness doctrine appears to preclude most meaningful appellate
18
review.
The absence of active judicial review may also be attributed to
tactical decisions of union lawyers. To avoid formal, perhaps pervasive restrictions imposed by a state judge with all the attendant costs
and adverse publicity, Atleson found that in the labor relations community of Buffalo, New York, injunction practice emphasized attorney-negotiated terms of injunction orders."9 Thus, despite the restraining language of New York's legislation and in circumstances
where evidence of violence may be "doubtful, '... lawyers set the
boundaries of acceptable conduct about the location and number of
pickets, reaffirming the belief that picketing necessarily means violence and challenging the commitment to a robust legitimacy for
collective action.
We are left with a paradox. Pervasive legal recognition of the
right to engage in collective action seems to have exhausted the enthusiasm of federal courts to issue injunctions in the name of preserving property rights. But administrative agencies and state courts, constrained by the same legal environment that acknowledges the legiti-

187. F. H. Hogue Produce Co. v. UFWOC, 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2153 (Super. CL Ariz
June 25, 1971).
188. Anaconda Co. v. Local 404, JUE, 372 N.Y.S.2d 152 (Sup. CL 1975). See also Logan v. Stannard, 439 P.2d 24 (Wyo. 1968) (remanding to the trial court that issued a temporary injunction for determination of whether an employer-employee relationship is necessary,
as a matter of law, in order to maintain a labor dispute under the statute).
189. See Bancroft & Martin, Inc. v. Truckers Local 340, 412 A.2d 1216 (Me. 1980)
(appealing from injunction against blocking access; injunction was moot because strikers had
returned to work); Coin Millwork Co. v. Lumber Workers, 435 P.2d 1015 (Or. 1967) (stating
that where picketing has ceased, questions of procedural regularities regarding injunction are
moot). But see Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Lumber Workers Local 2949, 679 P.2d 289 (Or.
1984) (vacating injunction against all but one union official because evidence did not establish clear proof of officials' participation, authorization, or ratification of unlawful acts).
190. Atleson, supra note 170, at 60-63.
191. ld. at 66.
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macy of collective action, revert to the reasoning and rhetoric of law
as the guardian of property rights."
I do not believe that federal judges, as compared to their administrative and state counterparts, have a deeper commitment to enforcement of statutory law. Nor would I suggest that the temperament of
federal judges is less easily swayed by class biases. Several considerations may help to explain the differing responses to similar legal
mandates.
First, there is federalism. Control of violence and maintenance of
public order are traditional concerns of local government. Even the
broad preemption doctrine of the NLRA recognizes the continuing
power of states to regulate those aspects of labor relations that are a
matter of particular local concern, like violence during a labor dispute."' Federal judges who follow the mandates of anti-injunction
legislation may do so secure in the knowledge that theirs are not the
courts of last resort. State judges, on the other hand, articulate a
special responsibility to foster security and stability in their communities. This obligation may have an unusually strong influence when the
task is to locate the line between peaceful persuasion and violent
coercion. Indeed, state judges may genuinely believe that anti-injunction legislation at the federal level should be strictly construed precisely because violence is a matter of state concern, and that limitations on state court equity powers cannot be similarly restrictive. This
sentiment may be reinforced if state judges view labor disputes as
essentially private in nature, a view that harkens back to the .early
20th century.19

192.

Are these decision-makers correct? Are collective actions in general and picketing in

particular inherently intimidating? Or are they so inextricably intertwined with the force and
threats of violence as to condemn as foolish any effort to separate out the peaceful and
lawful elements? Perhaps the images of violence that recur in the jurisprudence of the labor

injunction mirror real life and it is time for fuzzy-minded intellectuals to concede the accuracy of the long-held revulsion against coordinated collective action. The conclusion of commentators and historians is otherwise. As Richard Hofstadter observed in 1970, ....
labor
often got the blame for violent outbursts that were primarily the work of police or other

agents of employers. Hence one speaks of 'labor violence' but not of 'capital violence."'
HoFSTADTER, supra note 45, at 39.
193. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (holding state
courts are without jurisdiction over matters protected or prohibited by NLRA); United Constr.
Workers v. Labumumn Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954) (providing an exception for violent

activity).
194. Cf. Note, Labor Picketing and Commercial Speech: Free Enterprise Values in the
Doctrine of Free Speech, 91 YALE LJ. 938, 955-57 (1982) (arguing that the Supreme Court

wrongly excludes labor picketing from constitutional protections afforded to public issue picketing).
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Timing may be another consideration. Most of the federal cases
that deny or severely limit equitable relief on the strength of Norris-

LaGuardia occurred during a period of intense organizing activity by
industrial workers. Labor aggressively harnessed collective action, not
administrative agencies or courts, to compel employers to negotiate

and sign collective bargaining agreements.'

These confrontations re-

minded federal judges that national labor policy anticipated tolerance
of all but clearly violent conduct. By contrast, the state and administrative limits on picketing that Aaron, Atleson and I examined occurred after 1947, during a period in which accommodation rather

than confrontation was the dominant theme in labor relations."
Without the repeated exposure to aggressive use of collective activity

combined with the fresh understanding that "labor disputes, as such,
with the assembling, the picketing, the persuasion, the stopping of
work, the enlisting of sympathy and support...

[are] legitimate

means for advancing the interests of the working man, and therefore,
of the people as a whole,""I modem state and administrative judges,

like their early 20th century counterparts, hear only the siren song of
preserving property rights.'

This is not surprising. The only recog-

nition of collective rights in United States law is in legislation to
regulate collective bargaining.1" In all other regards, the law privi-

195. See LIZABETH COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO
1919-1939, at 301-21 (1990); BERNSTEIN, supra note 43.
196. See DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 182-211 (1980). I do not
wish to overstate the proposition. Struggle in the form of labor disputes continued, most notably the strike activity of 1945 through 1946, and continues with Pittston, Ravenswood and
Pittsburgh being the most recent examples. See David Moberg, Lock-Out Knock-Out, IN
THESE TIMES, June 24-July 7, 1992, at 12; Pittsburgh Papers Halt Publication After Two
Days, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1992, at A-8. The experiences during World War II, when labor
leaders took the no strike pledge and the War Labor Board facilitated the negotiation of
collective bargaining agreements, provided the ideology and empirical reference for the
accommodationist model. See also Howard Kimeldorf, World War I and the Deradicalization
of American Labor: The ILWU as a Deviant Case, 33 LAB. HIST. 248, 276 (1992) (stating
that the left's commitment to wartime production goals and the entry in World War II of
workers who had not experienced the Great Depression "deflected the radical potential of

American labor"). The Taft-Hartley amendments, which closely regulate secondary activity,
added to the attractiveness of accommodation. However, as Pittston and Ravenswood demonstrate, even with Taft-Hartley (and a far chillier climate for organized labor than in the
1950's) accommodation is not the only option.
197. Carter v. Herrin Motor Freight Lines, 131 F.2d 557, 560 (5th Cir. 1942).
198. See Boys Mkts.. Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (holding that federal courts may enjoin peaceful strikes in breach of no strike promises in order to
preserve the integrity of collective bargaining agreements).
199. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (holding that the
Frst Amendment of the United States Constitution recognizes the right to engage in concert-
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leges only individual rights, like the right to own and use property.' When a right is an isolated exception, its legitimacy and effective employment require a constant struggle. Moving the exercise of
collective rights from the plant floor to the negotiating table or from

the streets to the hearing room means that contentious collective
action no longer presents itself as an inevitable aspect of everyday
workplace life."°
M.

CONCLUSION

Despite the deliberate effort to use law to alter popular and

judicial perceptions about the proper balance between collective activity and property rights, the image of workers as violent and capital as

requiring constant protection by the state survives. Does this example
instruct that reform through law is irrelevant at best, pernicious at
worst?' I think not.'n The campaign for tolerance of collective

ed activity by construction).
200. For a time it appeared that federal law would privilege civil rights as collective
ones. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). That possibility looks remote
now. See Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Multiple Perspectives in
Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TE L WOMEN & L. 95, 138-42 (1992).
201. In pointing out the effect of the limited use of self-help by labor organizations, I
intend no criticism. Given the current climate of opinion and state of the law, unionists cannot be faulted for holding their jobs to be more important than the commitment to the principle of self-help through strikes and picketing. Indeed, unionists should be applauded for
developing alternative strategies with promise of success. On such strategies, see No More
Business As Usual: Labor's Corporate Campaigns, 21 LAB. RES. REV. (Fall/Winter 1993).
202. Respectable authority exists for virtually every position. Piven and Cloward reject
any role for law, insisting on mass movements as the exclusive engine for social change. See
FRANcES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS (1977). Steve
Bachmann, an activist and lawyer, holds that law and lawyers have at most a marginal (but
potentially liberating) impact on social change. See Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 4, 41 (1984-85). See also Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1988). Critical legal scholars, such as Mark Tushnet, invest
law with tremendous power but find that power deployed to maintain the status quo. See
Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tix. L. REV. 1363 (1984). Randall Kennedy credits
law with leading to positive, if limited, changes. See Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's
Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YAE LJ. 999, 1062-67
(1989). See also GERALD N. ROsENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN CouRTS BRiNe ABOUT
SoCLL CHANGE? (1991) (positing the unremarkable conclusion that courts cannot produce
change in the absence of cooperation from political and economic systems).
203. Although I acknowledge that the story of anti-injunction legislation could be used to
argue a different conclusion. For example, critical race scholars, like Bell and Delgado, treat
harshly the civil rights movement, focusing on the limited gains in racial equality and emphasizing the use of "progressive" law to stabilize race relations at a point of comfort for
whites. See DEREK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 2-63 (3d ed. 1992); Richard
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activity at the expense of property rights has had a limited success
and legal restrictions on the use of injunctions in labor disputes contributed to that success. That the law's contribution was neither necessary nor sufficient to the goals of furthering collective rights and
reducing class inequality does not render the contribution trivial.'
At the time of the adoption of anti-injunction legislation, the
social and economic arrangements of the United States were unstable.
The collective demands of organized labor and the unemployed for
jobs and dignity were an element contributing to this instability.
These demands were pressed in courts, legislatures, fields, factories,
and the streets. Collective activity became a powerful symbol of
worker solidarity, control and discipline. For fifty years, injunctions
had been used to denigrate collective action, to destroy worker solidarity. Anti-injunction legislation could help, not by insuring the
success of the collective demands, but by giving workers the psychological space and institutional opportunity to advance their claims. At
the institutional level, the anti-injunction legislation restricted the most
egregious forms of governmental repression and put a stop to establishment terror.' At the psychological level, the anti-injunction legislation, in combination with other changes in the way the state regu-

lated labor relations, triggered a preliminary acceptance by mainstream
opinion of the workers' right to engage in the struggle for solidarity,
control and dignity.
The law did not, of course, wipe out ingrained suspicions about
collective activity. This is not surprising. Legal scholars tend to

Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1991). Other scholars insist that the civil rights movement was
successful at challenging racial barriers to equal treatment, see Kennedy, supra note 202.
Both sides in the debate are correct. For southern blacks, and for blacks throughout the country, the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act were significant achievements
signaling legitimacy, empowerment, and an end to state-supported inequality. For concerned
whites in the north and the south, the federal legislation signalled a commitment to end
finally state-supported discrimination. But the critical race scholars are correct, too: the laws
may have lulled many into complacency and legislation did not end racism. With regard to
the subject of this essay, the tolerance of collective activity at the expense of property rights,
it can be argued that Norris-LaGuardia coopted the labor movement or that workers who
benefitted from the anti-injunction legislation developed a sense of solidarity and legitimacy.
Perhaps, as in the case of the civil rights laws, both assessments are correct and each is
incomplete in isolation.
204. If we describe the ultimate goal as an end to class inequality, anti-injunction legislation clearly has not been sufficient to secure class equality. Nor would anti-injunction legislation be necessary if worker protest of inequality took a revolutionary form.
205. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g. BLACK'S LAw DICIoNARY, distinguishing between picketing and peaceable
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describe the law as a solution to a problem, when we should acknowledge the more modest reality that any law will at best ameliorate bad effects and help those concerned to organize a long-term,

nonlegal solution to a problem.'

Perhaps our hyperbole is a politi-

cal maneuver. But having described law as generating change, we

then condemn law for not delivering. Although we know that underlying social and economic factors explain the distance between goal
and reality, we have been seduced by our own rhetoric.

It seems to me that Norfis-LaGuardia could be described as a
failure only if it had not opened up to workers the institutional and
psychological opportunities to pursue their demands for solidarity,
control and dignity. While many attitudes about collective activity and
property rights seem unchanged from the 1880's to the 1980's, one
fact has altered. The concept of collective rights has been accorded a
formal legitimacy in both law and opinion. Injunctions may be used
to limit but not to deny the right to picket in connection with labor
disputes. This gain is not trivial because the opportunity for struggle

remains.'

picketing.
207. See generally Sparer, supra note 12 (describing the organizational purpose of securing pre-termination hearings for welfare recipients); Bachmann, supra note 202 (describing a
variety of legal tactics employed by AcoRN, a non-profit corporation of low-income persons
organized into neighborhood groups). See also Austin, supra note 202; James Gray Pope,
Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the
Living Constitution, 69 TIx. L. REV. 889 (1991) (discussing community-labor coalitions).
208. As E. P. Thompson wrote, regarding a related struggle:
In all of this I may be wrong. I am told that, just beyond the horizon, new forms
of working-class power are about to arise which, being founded upon egalitarian
productive relations, will require no inhibition and can dispense with the negative
restrictions of bourgeois legalism. A historian is unqualified to pronounce on such
utopian projections. All that he knows is that he can bring in support of them no
historical evidence whatsoever. His advice might be: watch this new power for a
century or two before you cut your hedges down.
THOMPSON, supra note 12, at 266.
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